Phenomenal structuralism marks a significant shift in the study of consciousness, emphasizing the relational properties of experiential qualities rather than their intrinsic properties. This approach highlights how subjective qualities are organized and related, proposing that these structural relationships individuate such qualities within a multidimensional space. This paper focuses on the...
Abstract: The idea that “consciousness causes the collapse of the wave function” has never been popular among physicists. The main reason being that the alleged interaction makes the resulting theory mysterious and in tension with physicalism. The Subjective-Objective Collapse (SOC) model attends these worries. SOC is an objective collapse model where the collapse operator depends upon a...
It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form...
The traditional approach in cognitive sciences holds that cognition is a matter of manipulating abstract symbols following certain rules. According to this view, the body is merely an input/output device, which allows the computational system—the brain—to acquire new input data by means of the senses and to act in the environment following its commands. In opposition to this classical view,...
Abstract The non‐transitivity of the relation looks the same as has been used to argue that the relation has the same phenomenal character as is non‐transitive—a result that jeopardizes certain theories of consciousness. In this paper, I argue against this conclusion while granting the premise by dissociating lookings and phenomenology; an idea that some might find counter‐intuitive. However,...
The well-known distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness has moved away from the conceptual domain into the empirical one, and the debate now is focused on whether the neural mechanisms of cognitive access are constitutive of the neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I want to analyze the consequences that a negative reply to this question has...