Beyond Mirroring
The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition October 9, 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198735410.013.29 (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe current debate on empathy suffers from a diversity of definitions and no consensus. This paper does not aim to resolve these disputes but instead explores the potential of applying embodied, extended, enactive, and embedded (4E) approaches to empathy research. These approaches integrate insights from phenomenology and cognitive sciences, highlighting the role of reciprocity, intentional alignment, embodied simulation, and the second-person perspective. They also challenge the widespread assumption that empathy amounts to affective matching or mirroring.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 12 |
| Key finding | Argues that 4E approaches (embodied, extended, enactive, embedded) can integrate phenomenology and cognitive science to better understand empathy, and that the assumption empathy equals affective matching is inadequate. |
Abstract
Abstract When considering the current debate on empathy, it quickly becomes evident that a diversity of definitions of and approaches to the topic are available, and that no consensus seems forthcoming. The aim of our contribution is not to resolve these disputes or to argue in favor of any one particular way of conceptualizing empathy. Instead, our aim is to open up a new perspective by exploring the potential of applying embodied, extended, enactive, and embedded approaches to empathy research. As we shall see, these approaches help to integrate insights from phenomenology and the cognitive sciences in thinking about empathy, as well as in understanding the role of reciprocity, intentional alignment, embodied simulation, and the second-person perspective in empathy. They also highlight the inadequacy of the widespread assumption that empathy amounts to a form of affective matching or mirroring.