Oxford Handbooks Online
May 1, 2012
Lawrence A. Shapiro
8 citations
Embodied cognition offers an alternative to cognitivism by arguing that cognition is not merely computational manipulation of static representations. Cognitivism treats the mind as a passive receptor that transforms input representations (e.g., shading) into outputs (e.g., shape) via algorithms, requiring isolated experimental stimuli. Gibson's theory of perception instead holds that information in the optic array directly specifies opportunities for action, allowing active observers to perceive their world relative to their needs without further mental embellishment. Embodied cognition researchers propose this as a new framework for studying the mind, emphasizing the role of the body and environment in shaping cognitive processes.
Oxford Handbooks Online
October 5, 2016
Mark R. Leary, Kirk Warren Brown, Kate J. Diebels
3 citations
People with a hypo-egoic mindset are more focused on the present moment, process experiences with minimal internal commentary, and have a less individuated identity. They balance their own interests with others' needs, care less about how others evaluate them, and show greater emotional equanimity. Interpersonally, they tend to be agreeable, attentive, and caring. These characteristics likely make them more prone to experiences such as flow, awe, compassion, and mystical states.
Oxford Handbooks Online
April 5, 2018
Tore Nielsen
1 citation
The fleeting dream images of sleep onset, called microdreams, are briefer and simpler than REM dreams and more accessible to study. Examining their phenomenology has helped develop a classification system for dreaming's core features (Windt's oneiragic spectrum), establish a structure for assessing dreaming's multiple memory inputs, uncover two new types of imagery (autosensory and exosensory), and provide a framework for explaining microdreaming processes through multisensory integration. Continued focus on microdream neurophenomenology may help resolve questions about dreaming's core features, brain correlates, and memory sources.
Oxford Handbooks Online
April 5, 2018
Zachary C. Irving, Evan Thompson
Standard psychological definitions of mind-wandering as task-unrelated or stimulus-independent thought have significant shortcomings: they miss the dynamic nature of mind-wandering, include task-unrelated thoughts that are not mind-wandering, and exclude task-related mind-wandering. Philosophical analysis offers improved accounts, particularly defining mind-wandering as 'unguided thinking.' This definition is conceptually and phenomenologically precise and can be operationalized for empirical research, unlike definitions based on meta-awareness, cognitive agency, or disunity.
Oxford Handbooks Online
April 5, 2018
Erin J. Wamsley
Dreams are not a mysterious experience separate from waking thought but arise from the same brain processes that produce spontaneous thoughts during wakefulness. New evidence indicates these processes involve the brain's memory systems, which support the consolidation of newly learned experiences. During both sleep and wakefulness, fragments of recent memories are recombined with related older memories and general knowledge to create novel scenarios. This adaptive process contributes to memory consolidation and is reflected in the phenomenology of both nightly dreams and waking daydreams.
Oxford Handbooks Online
April 5, 2018
Elizaveta Solomonova
Sleep paralysis is a temporary inability to move or speak during transitions into or out of sleep, often accompanied by vivid sensory experiences such as visual, auditory, or tactile hallucinations and a feeling of presence. This chapter examines these experiences through enactive cognition and cultural neurophenomenology, reviews current neurophysiological knowledge and related conditions, and suggests coping techniques. As a hybrid state of dreaming and waking, sleep paralysis provides insight into the phenomenology of spontaneous thought during sleep.
Oxford Handbooks Online
April 5, 2018
Jennifer Windt, Ursula Voss
Lucid dreaming, often seen as a counterexample to the spontaneous nature of dreams because it involves deliberate control, is actually a valuable model for studying spontaneous thought. The chapter argues that lucid insight and control can arise from spontaneous cognitive processes, not just conscious reasoning, and that investigating dream lucidity can clarify how metacognitive awareness interacts with the spontaneous, imagistic thinking that generates dream content. This raises new questions about the relationship between metacognition and spontaneity.
Oxford Handbooks Online
April 5, 2018
Halvor Eifring
Contemplative traditions across Eurasia have held conflicting views on spontaneous thought for over two millennia. While often seen as a distraction that binds practitioners to the phenomenal world and is used by demons to tempt the devout, many traditions also believe that the fruits of contemplative practice arise spontaneously, not through deliberate effort, and that certain spontaneous thoughts can aid progress. Traditions have recommended various approaches, including active suppression, mindful observation, harmonious regulation, and acceptance, with specific antidotes such as reciting sacred texts, mantras, performing good deeds, ascetic exercises, or rituals of repentance and confession.
Oxford Handbooks Online
October 5, 2017
Helen Y. Weng, Brianna S. Schuyler, Richard J. Davidson
Compassion meditation trains people to feel compassion for themselves and others, and may lead to more prosocial behavior. An emotion-regulation model proposes three processes that change how people respond to suffering: increasing empathy, decreasing avoidance, and increasing compassionate responses. These changes may transfer to everyday behavior, making prosocial actions more likely even when not meditating. The authors review neuroscientific and behavioral evidence that supports this model and suggest directions for future research to test it further.
Oxford Handbooks Online
June 6, 2017
William F. Bristow
Hegel's 'Reason chapter' in the Phenomenology of Spirit achieves narrative unity by tracing how rational consciousness becomes purposive activity, first as an organism, then as goal-directed human action, and finally as human action that is its own end. These successive forms arise from attempts to resolve a tension between rational consciousness's certainty of being an existing individual and its certainty of being all reality. The internal criticism of these forms constitutes a general critique of modern self-consciousness, especially its individualism. The transition to spirit—specifically ethical life—contains a tension between the realization of reason and its repudiation.
Oxford Handbooks Online
June 2, 2016
Christian Coseru
The Buddhist philosopher Śāntarakṣita challenges the Cārvāka materialist view that consciousness can be fully explained by physical causation. He argues that causal accounts of material generation fail to explain how conscious awareness acquires its structural and phenomenal features. The chapter claims that arguments against reductive physicalism benefit from understanding phenomenal consciousness without rejecting causal-explanatory reasoning. Against causal models relying on potentiality, the Buddhist principle of dependent arising offers a dynamic conception of efficient causality, where elements defined by sentience and agency can be causally efficacious.
Oxford Handbooks Online
September 5, 2013
Tim Bayne
The normal unity of consciousness may fragment or break down in psychiatric disorders. This chapter examines how different forms of unity of consciousness can be lost in conditions like multiple personality disorder, schizophrenia, and depersonalization.