17 papers in the library · 39 citations · publishing 2020-2026
Behavioral and Brain Sciences September 17, 2026 Johannes Kleiner
Biological naturalism, as explicated by Seth, is indispensable for a balanced and metaphysically neutral science of AI consciousness. However, most of the properties that Seth explores might not be unique to living systems. Therefore, I argue, a biological naturalist research programme in consciousness science requires an explicit definition of biological naturalism. I discuss how such a...
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences January 30, 2026 Johannes Kleiner
The Newman problem is a fundamental problem that threatens to undermine structural assumptions and structural theories throughout philosophy and science. Here, we consider the problem in the context of consciousness science. We introduce and discuss the problem, and explain why it is detrimental not only to structuralist assumptions, but also to theories of consciousness, if left unconsidered....
PsyArXiv July 7, 2025 Johannes Kleiner preprint
This paper presents a mathematical analysis of the logic of measuring Neural Correlates of Consciousness (NCCs). Starting from the canonical definition of NCCs provided by Crick and Koch (1990) and Chalmers (2000), a series of lemmas and theorems are provided which show how NCCs can be discovered if empirical data about the co-activation of neural states and states of consciousness is...
2025 Johannes Kleiner
It is perhaps somewhat surprising, from an external point of view, that the scientifc study of consciousness, also known as consciousness science, comprises a host of mathematical models, methods, and questions.This is the case, on the one hand, because it builds on mathematical models and mathematical methods developed in other sciences, for example models of the brain, analysis techniques,...
Neuroscience of Consciousness December 26, 2024 Johannes Kleiner, Tim A. Ludwig
We apply the methodology of no-go theorems as developed in physics to the question of artificial consciousness. The result is a no-go theorem which shows that under a general assumption, called dynamical relevance, Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems that run on contemporary computer chips cannot be conscious. Consciousness is dynamically relevant, simply put, if, according to a theory of...
arXiv Preprint Archive March 6, 2024 Johannes Kleiner preprint
Computational functionalism posits that consciousness is a computation. Here we show, perhaps surprisingly, that it cannot be a Turing computation. Rather, computational functionalism implies that consciousness is a novel type of computation that has recently been proposed by Geoffrey Hinton, called mortal computation.
Consciousness and Cognition February 28, 2024 Johannes Kleiner
Recent activities in virtually all fields engaged in consciousness studies indicate early signs of a structural turn, where verbal descriptions or simple formalisations of conscious experiences are replaced by structural tools, most notably mathematical spaces. My goal here is to offer three comments that, in my opinion, are essential to avoid misunderstandings in these developments early on....
September 4, 2023 Johannes Kleiner preprint
Recent activities in virtually all fields engaged in consciousness studies indicate early signs of a structural turn, where verbal descriptions or simple formalisations of conscious experiences are replaced by structural tools, most notably mathematical spaces. My goal here is to offer three comments that, in my opinion, are essential to avoid misunderstandings in these developments early on....
Frontiers in Applied Mathematics and Statistics May 22, 2023 Xerxes D. Arsiwalla, Johannes Kleiner, Sean Tull et al.
EDITORIAL article Front. Appl. Math. Stat., 22 May 2023Sec. Dynamical Systems Volume 9 - 2023 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fams.2023.1214939
Frontiers in Psychology May 16, 2023 Xerxes D. Arsiwalla, Narayanan Srinivasan, Luca Simione et al. 2 citations
EDITORIAL article Front. Psychol., 16 May 2023Sec. Consciousness Research Volume 14 - 2023 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1205982
Frontiers in Psychology April 20, 2023 Narayanan Srinivasan, Luca Simione, Xerxes D. Arsiwalla et al.
EDITORIAL article Front. Psychol., 20 April 2023Sec. Consciousness Research Volume 14 - 2023 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1182690
arXiv (Cornell University) April 11, 2023 Johannes Kleiner, Tim A. Ludwig preprint
We demonstrate that if consciousness is relevant for the temporal evolution of a system's states--that is, if it is dynamically relevant--then AI systems cannot be conscious. That is because AI systems run on CPUs, GPUs, TPUs or other processors which have been designed and verified to adhere to computational dynamics that systematically preclude or suppress deviations. The design and...
arXiv Preprint Archive January 26, 2023 Johannes Kleiner, Tim A. Ludwig preprint
In consciousness science, several promising approaches have been developed for how to represent conscious experience in terms of mathematical spaces and structures. What is missing, however, is an explicit definition of what a 'mathematical structure of conscious experience' is. Here, we propose such a definition. This definition provides a link between the abstract formal entities of...
Frontiers in Applied Mathematics and Statistics June 4, 2021 Johannes Kleiner, Sean Tull
Integrated Information Theory is one of the leading models of consciousness. It aims to describe both the quality and quantity of the conscious experience of a physical system, such as the brain, in a particular state. In this contribution, we propound the mathematical structure of the theory, separating the essentials from auxiliary formal tools. We provide a definition of a generalized IIT...
Consciousness and Cognition October 1, 2020 Johannes Kleiner
Recently, it has been claimed that Integrated Information Theory and other theories of its type cannot explain consciousness ("unfolding argument"). We unravel this argument mathematically and prove that the premises of the argument imply a much stronger result according to which the observed problem holds for almost all theories of consciousness. We find, however, that one of the premises is...
Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) May 30, 2020 Johannes Kleiner 37 citations
In recent years, promising mathematical models have been proposed that aim to describe conscious experience and its relation to the physical domain. Whereas the axioms and metaphysical ideas of these theories have been carefully motivated, their mathematical formalism has not. In this article, we aim to remedy this situation. We give an account of what warrants mathematical representation of...
arXiv Preprint Archive April 7, 2020 Johannes Kleiner, Erik Hoel preprint
The search for a scientific theory of consciousness should result in theories that are falsifiable. However, here we show that falsification is especially problematic for theories of consciousness. We formally describe the standard experimental setup for testing these theories. Based on a theory's application to some physical system, such as the brain, testing requires comparing a theory's...