Explanatory profiles of models of consciousness - towards a systematic classification.

Different models of consciousness subscribe to different notions of explanation, use different tools, and aim to explain different phenomena, making direct comparison difficult. A framework is presented that compares models along three minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation, and target of explanation. The approach may help identify driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, and experimental predictions, and points toward more integrative theoretical research where axiomatic models could resolve current contradictions.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Models of consciousness aim to inspire new experimental protocols and aid interpretation of empirical evidence to reveal the structure of conscious experience. Nevertheless, no current model is univocally accepted on either theoretical or empirical grounds. Moreover, a straightforward comparison is difficult for conceptual reasons. In particular, we argue that different models explicitly or implicitly subscribe to different notions of what constitutes a satisfactory explanation, use different tools in their explanatory endeavours and even aim to explain very different phenomena. We thus present a framework to compare existing models in the field with respect to what we call their 'explanatory profiles'. We focus on the following minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation and target of explanation. We also discuss the empirical consequences of the discussed discrepancies among models. This approach may eventually lead to identifying driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, experimental predictions and a better design of future testing experiments. Finally, our conclusion points to more integrative theoretical research, where axiomatic models may play a critical role in solving current theoretical and experimental contradictions.