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Philosophy of mind: all studies

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Research

Art and linguistic bodies: a transformative view

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences April 1, 2026 Ståle Finke, Thomas Netland, Mattias Solli 2 citations

This article takes its point of departure from the second (embodied) linguistic turn represented by the enactivist notion of humans as linguistic bodies, using resources from Hans Georg Gadamer in order to propose a view of the relation between art and everyday experience as one of symbolic transformation. Conceiving art as a form of linguistic phenomenon wherein one can engage in original...

Poor insight and self-disorders in schizophrenia: an empirical study.

European Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience April 1, 2026 Lars Siersbæk Nilsson, Julie Nordgaard, Mads Gram Henriksen et al. 5 citations

Poor insight is a core feature of schizophrenia and empirical studies have demonstrated associations with important symptom domains, cognitive functions, and clinical outcomes. While recent explanatory accounts mostly focus on neuro-, social-, or meta-cognitive deficits, a complementary model from phenomenological psychopathology suggests that impaired insight in schizophrenia is tied to...

Giving thickness to the minimal self: coenesthetic depth and the materiality of consciousness

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences April 1, 2026 István Fazakas, Mathilde Bois, Tudi Gozé 7 citations

Contemporary phenomenological psychopathology has raised questions concerning selfhood and its possible alterations in schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Although the notion of the self is central to several accounts of anomalies, it remains a question how exactly the radically minimal experiential features of selfhood can be altered. Indeed, the risk is to reduce the notion of selfhood so...

Mental Construction: A Shared Framework in Psychology and Husserl-Inspired Model of Intentionality

Journal for General Philosophy of Science March 26, 2026 Chang Liu, Bin Ye

Constructionists claim that emotions result from the categorization of a kind of phenomenal character, or what is known as core affect. This categorization takes shape in terms of prior situated experience. Husserl, in turn, suggests that perceptions emerge from the apprehension of a kind of phenomenal character. Similarly, this also takes shape in terms of prior situated experience. Thus, the...

The Universe Is Not Conscious

International Journal of Jungian Studies March 25, 2026 Jon Mills

Abstract It has been fashionable in recent times to posit an ontology of consciousness that saturates all features of the universe and is the organizational ground of the cosmos itself. Against current trends in the philosophy of mind that adopt a return to panpsychism, metaphysical attempts to revitalize and rehabilitate a Neoplatonic paradigm of Oneness, and neo-Jungian perspectives that...

DOI: 10.1163/19409060-bja10062 (opens in new tab) Philosophy of mind Metaphysics Holism Philosophy of science +16

Philosophy and Neuroscience: Tango or Solo Dancing?

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology March 25, 2026 Steven S. Gouveia, Ângela Leite

In this paper, I want to briefly introduce how four approaches that relate (or not) philosophical investigation with the neuroscientific research can be considered in order to achieve a methodology that can effectively investigate the phenomenon of the conscious mind and its relationship with the brain. The traditional way of defining philosophical work seems to be clearly opposed to the...

DOI: 10.5007/1808-1711.2026.e106055 (opens in new tab) Philosophy of mind Reductionism Embodied cognition Focus optics +13

Considerations on Behavior Based on Merleau-Ponty’s Criticisms

Theory & Psychology March 23, 2026 Henrique Mesquita Pompermaier, Carlos Eduardo Lopes

In this paper, we explore the possibility of radical behaviorism to respond to the challenges posed by Merleau-Ponty to scientific psychology. According to this philosopher, modern dichotomous thinking places every psychological project in a stalemate: it adopts either mentalism, distancing itself from science, or physiologism, distancing itself from psychology. For Merleau-Ponty, the notion of...

Response to commentators on the blind spot: why science cannot ignore human experience

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences March 23, 2026 Evan Thompson

This article contains my response to the commentaries by Mazviita Chirimuuta, Tom Froese, Miriam Kyselo, and Claudia E. Vanney on The Blind Spot: Why Science Cannot Ignore Human Experience (Frank et al., 2024 ).

Cause, Effect, and the Nature of Mind

Preprints.org March 18, 2026 Tam Hunt preprint

What is causation, and how do mind and matter fit within the causal structure of reality? This paper argues that conventional reductionist causation — the view that causal influence flows only upward from microphysical constituents to larger and larger structures — is both metaphysically incomplete and inadequate to the facts. After surveying standard accounts of causation in Western philosophy...

Untying the World-Knot: Active Inference and the Pattern Theory of the Will in Schopenhauer

Preprints.org March 16, 2026 Gerd Leidig preprint

Contemporary philosophy of mind is beginning to rehabilitate Arthur Schopenhauer as a proto-phenomenologist whose metaphysics of the will—once divested of its ontological commitments—provides thick descriptions of embodied agency, self-structure, and intersubjective resonance. This article validates this thesis through a four-stage naturalized reconstruction: (1) Schopenhauer’s "world-knot" and...