Giving thickness to the minimal self: coenesthetic depth and the materiality of consciousness
István Fazakas, Mathilde Bois, Tudi Gozé
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences April 1, 2026 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-023-09951-w (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Coenesthesia Selfhood Body Hallucinations Schizophrenia |
| Citations | 7 |
| Key points | Argues that the minimal self must be conceived with a specific elemental thickness corresponding to a phenomenological materiality of embodiment, and that a reading of coenesthesia as the bodily element of ipseity sheds new light on anomalies of self-experience in schizophrenia spectrum disorders. |
Abstract
Contemporary phenomenological psychopathology has raised questions concerning selfhood and its possible alterations in schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Although the notion of the self is central to several accounts of anomalies, it remains a question how exactly the radically minimal experiential features of selfhood can be altered. Indeed, the risk is to reduce the notion of selfhood so drastically, that it can no longer account for alterations of experience. Here we propose to give thickness to the minimal self. To do this we first discuss Sartre’s phenomenological definition of coenesthesia as the translucent matter of consciousness articulating it with the notion of existential feelings. We then draw on the historical research on coenesthesia to dig deeper in this translucent materiality identified as the element of the body. We show that selfhood, even in its most minimal level, must be conceived of with a specific elemental thickness, corresponding to a phenomenological materiality of embodiment. We argue that a phenomenological reading of coenesthesia as the bodily element of ipseity can shed a new light on the anomalies of self-experience.
Comparable studies
Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. | 2003 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cited by 2
Cites 14
- Anomalous self-experience in depersonalization and schizophrenia: a comparative investigation. Consciousness and Cognition June 1, 2013
- Mysticism and schizophrenia: A phenomenological exploration of the structure of consciousness in the schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Consciousness and Cognition July 1, 2016
- I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2017
- Thought insertion and disturbed for-me-ness (minimal selfhood) in schizophrenia. Consciousness and Cognition September 1, 2019
- New Insight into Affectivity in Schizophrenia: from the Phenomenology of Marc Richir. Psychopathology 2017
and 9 more in the library