Mental Construction: A Shared Framework in Psychology and Husserl-Inspired Model of Intentionality
Chang Liu, Bin Ye
Journal for General Philosophy of Science March 26, 2026 DOI: 10.1007/s10838-026-09762-y (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Grounded cognition Embodied cognition |
| Key points | Argues that constructionist theories of emotion and Husserl's Apprehension Model are independent formulations of a single Construction Framework of the Mental (CFM), which treats folk psychological categories as constructs from basic mental processes. |
Abstract
Constructionists claim that emotions result from the categorization of a kind of phenomenal character, or what is known as core affect. This categorization takes shape in terms of prior situated experience. Husserl, in turn, suggests that perceptions emerge from the apprehension of a kind of phenomenal character. Similarly, this also takes shape in terms of prior situated experience. Thus, the constructionism of emotion and Husserl’s Apprehension Model can be seen as two independent formulations of one and the same framework. They both provide the Construction Framework of the Mental (CFM). This framework takes most folk psychological categories to be “constructs” built from more basic mental processes. Given the consistency of the constructionist framework of mental states with recent findings in neuroscience and competitive metaphysical positions, along with its application in psychology and phenomenology, this framework for the formation of mental states should be considered a feasible research framework.
Comparable studies
Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. | 2003 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cites 9
- The Brain's Default Mode Network Annual Review of Neuroscience May 4, 2015
- Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self Trends in Cognitive Sciences October 12, 2013
- The salience network is responsible for switching between the default mode network and the central executive network: Replication from DCM Neuroimage May 24, 2014
- On the relationship between the “default mode network” and the “social brain” Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 2012
- The wandering brain: Meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies of mind-wandering and related spontaneous thought processes Neuroimage February 25, 2015
and 4 more in the library