يهدف البحث إلى التعرف على أثر العلاج التدبيري الذي يمارسه الأخصائي الاجتماعي في فعالية الممارسة المهنية داخل المؤسسات الصحية في المجتمع السعودي 2030، ومن أجل تحقيق هذه الأهداف اعتمدت الدراسة على المنهج الوصفي التحليلي، وتم تطبيق الاستبيان على عينة عمدية من الأخصائيين والأخصائيات الذين يعملون بمستشفيات مختلفة بمدينة الرياض وبلغ عددهم (121) مفردة، واتضح من النتائج أن التطبيق المنهجي لليقظة...
In the previous chapter, we referred to dual-aspect monism frames; we observe here that whether the psycho-physically neutral reality in such frames may refer to consciousness is an open question. By consciousness, however, we mean fundamental awareness, not functional consciousness, which is conventionally meant by materialistic or physicalist frames. We will turn to the issue of fundamental...
How should we understand the radical changes in bodily awareness that occur during advanced meditation? Existing approaches subsume these changes under frameworks of self-dissolution or operationalize them through interoceptive measures that assume ongoing bodily sensation. This paper argues for bracketing the self when studying bodily awareness in advanced concentrative absorption meditation...
Meditation research is frequently framed in terms of reduced self-referential processing, yet converging evidence suggests that this description encompasses multiple mechanistically distinct states. The present work proposes a specific subclass, termed tranquil states, defined as resting-state conditions characterized by concurrent attenuation of default mode network activity — a finding...
Contemporary debates surrounding artificial intelligence and consciousness are frequently polarized between two extremes: claims that advanced AI systems are becoming conscious, and dismissals that they are “merely statistical machines.” This paper argues that both positions fail to grasp the deeper philosophical significance of generative AI. Drawing upon Jean Baudrillard’s theory of...
Consciousness has not been medically defined. It has been defined legally and socially, and those definitions have varied across jurisdictions and across centuries. The DSM does not define consciousness. The ICD does not define consciousness. There is no diagnostic biomarker for phenomenal experience. The AI consciousness debate has been proceeding as if a constitutive specification of...
Consciousness is a first-person experience, and no one has direct access to another's experience. This generates a problem that precedes the hard problem of David Chalmers. We need to know how to identify the existence of subjective experience in others before we can analyse it. I argue that the attribution of mind is irreducibly inductive. Every method proposed to verify another's...
This paper examines large language models (LLMs) from the perspective of philosophy of mind and AI ethics, with a particular focus on the emergence of intentional structures in sustained interaction. Rather than asking whether LLMs possess human–like minds or phenomenal qualia, we investigate whether entities lacking demonstrable internal phenomenology can nonetheless participate in temporally...
Educational philosophy frequently grapples with a persistent analytical divide betweensociocultural macro-structures and the embodied, existential microdynamics of the individual.While Cultural-Historical Activity Theory (CHAT) provides robust tools for analyzingsystemic contradictions, it often leaves the operational level of the lived body undertheorized.Conversely, 4E cognition and...
In a world understood through Existential Realism (ER) – where only the present moment truly “exists” – and under Minimal-Dual Awareness (MDA) – a mode of consciousness with reduced self–other splits and narrative thought – a puzzle arises: What grounds our obligations, commitments, and ethical agency when the “story-self” dissolves? We propose that ethical authority is rooted in the relational...