Beyond the Cartesian Self
Phenomenology and Mind September 17, 2018 DOI: 10.13128/phe_mi-19643 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Review Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Heterophenomenology Neurophenomenology First-person Third-person Science |
| Citations | 2 |
| Key findings | First-person data cannot be reduced to third-person data without remainder when the subject matter includes the first-person perspective. |
Abstract
I review a number of approaches that attempt to deal with the gap that seems to exist between first-person and third-person accounts of consciousness, and some of the conceptual, epistemological, and methodological issues that surround this distinction. I argue, with reference to Carnap and Schrödinger, that one cannot simply reduce data from the first-person perspective to third-person data, without remainder, especially when the very subject matter of the science includes the first-person perspective.