A Phenomenological Discussion of Early Imitation
Phenomenology and Mind September 17, 2018 DOI: 10.13128/phe_mi-19605 (opens in new tab)
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AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Husserl Meltzoff Imitation Cross-modal identity |
| Key points | Argues that Meltzoff's AIM model inadequately explains neonatal imitation because it cannot reconcile intermodal mapping with organ identification without making imitation reflexive, and it conflicts with adult first-person experience. Proposes that imitation is better explained by the "rhythmic resonance" of gestures, consistent with Husserlian phenomenology. |
Abstract
The following pages are devoted to an attempt to examine Andrew Meltzoff’s discoveries concerning neonatal imitation in the light of Husserl’s discussion of Fremderfahrung. We criticise Meltzoff’s explanatory model AIM (Active Intermodal Mapping), which is introduced to account for his empirical findings, for two main reasons. First, the AIM model does not seem to properly reconcile the vindication of the intermodal character of imitation with the idea that early imitation is based on organ identification: these two claims seem to be reconcilable only at the cost of sacrificing the active, non reflexlike character of imitation. Secondly, the account of AIM does not fit in with the ordinary first-person experience of adult imitation. In its stead we propose a different explanatory approach, which is consistent with a basic phenomenology of imitation and does not depend on organ identification, but on the “rhythmic resonance” of gestures.