Naturalizing Qualia
Alessandra Buccella
Phenomenology and Mind August 9, 2017 DOI: 10.13128/phe_mi-21114 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Hill's representationalist account of perceptual qualia faces a difficulty, and proposes that a broadly adverbialist view, developed from Chirimuuta's color adverbialism, better serves the project of naturalizing qualia than representationalism does. |
Abstract
Hill (2014) argues that perceptual qualia, i.e. the ways in which things look from a viewpoint, are physical properties of objects. They are relational in nature, that is, they are functions of objects’ intrinsic properties, viewpoints, and observers. Hill also claims that his kind of representationalism is the only view capable of “naturalizing qualia”. After discussing a worry with Hill’s account, I put forward an alternative, which is just as “naturalization-friendly”. I build upon Chirimuuta’s color adverbialism (2015), and I argue that we would better serve the “naturalizing project” if we abandoned representationalism and preferred a broadly adverbialist view of perceptual qualia.