Embodied First-Person Perspective
Phenomenology and Mind 2025 DOI: 10.17454/pam-2903 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that self-awareness and world-awareness are inherently embodied, with the embodied first-person perspective as their primary structure. Contends that the first-person perspective arises from the body's role as the zero-point of an oriented spatial field and is not reducible to subjective ownership or linguistic self-reference. Proposes that bodily ownership is rooted in the first-person perspective, challenging accounts by De Vignemont, Baker, and Zahavi. |
Abstract
In this paper I will argue that self-awareness and world-awareness are inherently embodied, with the embodied first-person perspective as their primary structure. Challenging dominant views, I contend that the first-person perspective is not reducible to subjective ownership of experiences or linguistic self-reference but arises from the body’s role as the zero-point of an oriented spatial field. This structuring feature of perception and action grounds the cognitive agent’s interaction with the environment. The study examines the relationship between first-person perspective and bodily self-awareness, particularly the interplay of ownership and agency, critiquing accounts by De Vignemont, Baker, and Zahavi. It argues that bodily ownership is rooted in the first-person perspective rather than independent of it. Drawing on phenomenology, the paper emphasizes that first-person experience is an intrinsic, pre-reflective structure of embodiment, irreducible to epistemic judgments or conceptual ascriptions, thus challenging reductionist views and reaffirming the primacy of the lived body in self-awareness.