The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness
July 9, 2020
Philip Goff, Sam Coleman
4 citations
Russellian monism is a broad philosophical approach to explaining consciousness, with two main variants: panpsychism and panprotopsychism. Panpsychist Russellian monism claims that the fundamental properties of basic physical entities are experiential, meaning consciousness is a basic feature of matter. Panprotopsychist Russellian monism instead holds that these fundamental properties are proto-experiential—not conscious themselves, but essential for producing consciousness. The chapter first examines panpsychist forms, then turns to panprotopsychist forms.
Religious Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion
August 1, 2025
Sam Coleman
If panpsychism is true, consciousness pervades the cosmos and there exist many more conscious subjects than other worldviews contemplate. The article argues that panpsychism's explanation of human consciousness entails that various conscious subjects exist within human organisms. Since consciousness likely confers moral status, questions arise about the wellbeing of these inner subjects. Their lives may not be morally suitable for sophisticated centers of consciousness, potentially generating more suffering than other worldviews. This would compound the problem of evil, forcing a choice between panpsychism and theism.
Mind and Matter
July 20, 2024
Sam Coleman
This philosophical paper examines Thomas Nagel's influential 1979 account of panpsychism, noting that his position appears to oscillate between panpsychism and neutral monism. To resolve this tension, the author proposes that both mental and physical properties should be understood as different dispositions grounded in a psychophysically neutral domain of nature. The argument engages with Nagel's views and offers a theoretical resolution to the apparent conflict between these two metaphysical positions.
Phenomenology & Mind
January 1, 2022
Sam Coleman
A philosophical argument that the essence of mentality is content-carrying qualitative character—mental qualities that can exist both consciously (as phenomenal experiences) and unconsciously. This reconciles Brentano's intentionality-based view with the phenomenal-qualitative approach, and accommodates the Freudian and cognitive-scientific posit of unconscious mental content. The author defends this unified conception against historical objections and explains its theoretical virtues.
Trans/Form/Ação
January 1, 2018
Sam Coleman
This paper explains David Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, reviews a major objection to it, and argues that the objection is ultimately ineffective. However, the author contends that the objection points to a reason to consider an alternative HOT theory. The author then presents their own version of HOT theory as a suitable alternative.
February 14, 2015
Sam Coleman
Existing higher-order representational theories of consciousness prevent subjects from being properly aware of their own first-order sensory states. A new theory, the quotational higher-order thought theory, uses the idea of ‘quoting’ sensory qualities to make subjects suitably intimate with their sensory experiences. This approach captures the notion of being ‘acquainted’ with conscious states without abandoning naturalism, and it addresses traditional problems about representational mismatch by replacing representational mechanisms with an embedding-based account of mental intentionality.