Real Selves? Subjectivity and the Subpersonal Mind
Michele Di Francesco, Massimo Marraffa, Alfredo Paternoster
Phenomenology and Mind November 26, 2016 DOI: 10.13128/phe_mi-19536 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 4 |
| Key points | Argues that the dilemma between no-self eliminativism and a robust account of the self can be resolved by restoring a robust theory of the subject based on a bottom-up approach consonant with contemporary neurocognitive science, together with a pluralistic reading of the science of the mental. |
Abstract
The current philosophical discussion on the self and consciousness is characterized by a contrast or dilemma between the no-self (eliminativist) perspective, on the one hand, and the arguably naïve account that takes the self as a robust entity, on the other.in order to solve the dilemma, in this paper we suggest restoring a robust theory of the subject based on a bottom-up approach (fully consonant with contemporary neurocognitive science) together with a pluralistic reading of the nature of the science of the mental.