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Irreducible Cognitive Phenomenology and the Aha! Experience

John Joseph Dorsch

Phenomenology and Mind January 3, 2017 DOI: 10.13128/phe_mi-20095 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that an augmented case for irreducible cognitive phenomenology, grounded in presentational phenomenology of high-level content rather than intuition or seeming to see, can withstand attempts to reduce cognitive phenomenology to sensory phenomenology. The author interprets Bowden and Jung-Beeman's Aha! Experience findings as further evidence, proposing that the Aha! Experience is a species of the experience of understanding.

Abstract

Elijah Chudnoff’s case for irreducible cognitive phenomenology hinges on seeming to see the truth of a mathematical proposition (Chudnoff 2015). In the following, I develop an augmented version of Chudnoff’s case, not based on seeming to see, or intuition, but based on being in a state with presentational phenomenology of high-level content. In contrast to other cases for cognitive phenomenology, those based on Strawson’s case (Strawson 2011), I argue that the case presented here is able to withstand counterarguments, which attempt to reduce cognitive phenomenology to sensory phenomenology. To support my argument, I present findings from Bowden and Jung-Beeman’s experiments with the Aha! Experience (Bowden & Jung-Beeman 2004), and argue that the Aha! Experience is a species of the experience of understanding presented here. I interpret the results of these experiments to provide further evidence for irreducible cognitive phenomenology.

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