Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology
Phenomenology and Mind November 1, 2019 DOI: 10.13128/phe_mi-23625 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Qualia Perception Enactivism |
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that the enactive theory of color, which implies color relationism, is a better alternative to color subjectivism and color objectivism, and that it aligns with Husserl's phenomenology in claiming the co-constitution of subject and object in experience. |
Abstract
In this paper, I present the enactive theory of color that implies a form of color relationism. I argue that this view constitutes a better alternative to color subjectivism and color objectivism. I liken the enactive view to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, arguing that both deconstruct the clear duality of subject and object, which is at the basis of the other theories of color, in order to claim the co-constitution of subject and object in the process of experience. I also extend the enactive and phenomenological account of color to the more general topic of the epistemological and ontological status of sensory qualities (qualia), outlining the fields of enactive phenomenology and enactive ontology.