The Conscious and Phenomenal Character of Thought: Reflections on Their Possible Dissociation
Phenomenology and Mind January 3, 2017 DOI: 10.13128/phe_mi-20091 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that the "obvious assumption" that conscious thought is phenomenal and phenomenal thought is conscious can be defended against dissociative arguments, transforming it from an unexamined assumption into a grounded, explicitly defensible claim. |
Abstract
In this paper I focus on what we can call “the obvious assumption” in the debate between defenders and deniers (of the reductionist sort) of cognitive phenomenology: conscious thought is phenomenal and phenomenal thought is conscious. This assumption can be refused if “conscious” and “phenomenal” are not co-extensive in the case of thought. I discuss some prominent ways to argue for their dissociation and I argue that we have reasons to resist such moves, and thus, that the “obvious assumption” can be transformed into a grounded claim one can explicitly believe and defend.