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Michele Di Francesco

2 papers in the library · publishing 2019-2020

Papers

Immaginare e sperimentare. Gli zombie e il problema della coscienza fenomenica

Rivista di Estetica January 30, 2019 Michele Di Francesco, Alfredo Tomasetta

Thought experiments about phenomenal consciousness have a legitimate and valuable role in philosophy. The paper first surveys the philosophical and scientific background of well-known mind-and-consciousness thought experiments, focusing on problems left unresolved by scientific theories and by attempts to reduce mind to the physical world. A case study of the zombie thought experiment shows how a simple, naive intuition generated complex arguments that have enriched philosophical and intellectual landscape. Overall, philosophy addresses properly philosophical questions about the mind and is not a junior partner to cognitive science.

DOI: 10.4000/estetica.898 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab)

Overcoming the Past-endorsement Criterion: Toward a Transparency-Based Mark of the Mental.

Frontiers in Psychology January 1, 2020 Giulia Piredda, Michele Di Francesco

A weak conscientialist mark of the mental based on transparent access can prevent the overextension of the mind (cognitive bloat) without identifying the mental with the conscious. This proposal connects the evaluation of criteria for extending the mind to the search for a mark of the mental, building on Clark and Chalmers' original criteria and earlier work by the authors. The concept of transparency vindicates consciousness's role in defining what is mental while avoiding the problem of cognitive bloat.

DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.01278 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Cognitive bloat Consciousness Extended mind Past-endorsement criterion +1