Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2018
Wanja Wiese
29 citations
A meta-theoretical analysis examines the method of interdisciplinary constraint satisfaction (MICS) introduced in Metzinger's Being No One, which combines phenomenological, representationalist, and neurobiological perspectives to study consciousness. Despite this approach's promise, a mature science of consciousness remains elusive more than a decade later. The paper identifies hurdles MICS has yet to overcome, evaluates how existing approaches address these gaps, and argues that a unifying theory integrating different features of consciousness is necessary for progress.
Minds and Machines
May 3, 2022
Danaja Rutar, Wanja Wiese, Johan Kwisthout
3 citations
Representations and their features can be gradual rather than all-or-nothing, but this idea has been largely overlooked in philosophy of mind. This paper develops a gradual account of two representational features—structural similarity and decoupling—within the predictive processing framework of neuroscience. Structural similarity is analyzed along two dimensions: the number of preserved relations and the granularity of state space, both of which vary continuously. Decoupling is gradual in two ways: different brain areas are involved in decoupled processes to varying degrees depending on whether their activity is caused internally or externally, and the degree of decoupling can be further regulated through precision weighting of prediction error. Gradation of both features supports behavioral success.
Consciousness and Cognition
August 13, 2025
Azenet Lopez, Wanja Wiese
Consciousness science has many competing theories that often conflict, making progress toward a mature theory difficult. A building-block approach offers a way forward by focusing on simpler elements that make up theories, such as key notions or assumptions, rather than committing to entire theoretical proposals. This approach can help assess, integrate, and unify diverse theories. Two potential building blocks discussed are attention and information generation, given their roles in leading theories. The paper argues that shifting focus to these foundational constructs facilitates addressing urgent questions about consciousness in both natural and artificial systems.
Communications Psychology
November 26, 2025
Morten Overgaard, Peter Fazekas, Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup et al.
The field of consciousness research lacks consensus due to reliance on competing grand theories. A more productive path forward would shift focus toward construct-based, data-driven, and iterative approaches that identify empirical building blocks of conscious experience, enabling cumulative and integrative progress.
Philosophical Studies
June 26, 2024
Wanja Wiese
The assumption that the right form of neural computation is sufficient for consciousness does not automatically mean that a digital simulation of those computations is conscious. From the perspective of Karl Friston's free energy principle, self-organising systems like living organisms have properties that are not present in classical von Neumann computer architectures. One such property—a specific kind of causal flow—can distinguish systems that merely simulate consciousness from those that actually replicate it.
Neuroscience of Consciousness
January 1, 2020
Wanja Wiese
This article argues that information generation, the ability to compress and later decompress information adapted to current purposes, should not be considered a sufficient condition for consciousness but can serve as a "minimal unifying model of consciousness" (MUM). A MUM specifies at least one necessary feature of consciousness, characterizes it in a determinable way, and shows it is entailed by many existing theories. The author contends that such a model is useful because it unifies theories by highlighting common assumptions while enabling further developments and empirical predictions. Unlike more specific theories that likely contain false assumptions, a MUM is probably adequate at a general level, functioning as guiding principles that allow refinements and more specific claims.
Experienced Wholeness
January 12, 2018
Wanja Wiese
Predictive processing (PP) is not itself a theory of consciousness, but it may inform consciousness research if taken as a general theory of brain function—the idea that the brain's primary job is to minimize prediction error. This chapter explores how PP explains attention and its relationship to consciousness, including how volitional attention can alter conscious contents. It also proposes that PP offers a unifying framework for several theories of consciousness, such as global workspace theory, attention schema theory, and integrated information theory.
Wanja Wiese, Karl Friston
preprint
The free energy principle reframes the search for neural correlates of consciousness by shifting focus from neural states to neural dynamics, and by adding computational correlates defined as probabilities encoded by neural states. This approach addresses two problems: explaining consciousness without sensory input or behavior, and distinguishing systems that genuinely are conscious from those that merely simulate consciousness. The principle-derived constraints help ascribe consciousness in controversial cases, such as during sensory deprivation, and clarify what it means to be a conscious system versus simulating one.