Consciousness qua Mortal Computation
arXiv Preprint Archive March 6, 2024 via arXiv
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractComputational functionalism holds that consciousness is a form of computation. This paper demonstrates that consciousness cannot be a Turing computation, but instead aligns with a type of computation proposed by Geoffrey Hinton called mortal computation.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Q-bio.nc Cs.ai Consciousness awareness Sentience Cognition |
| Key finding | Argues that computational functionalism implies consciousness is a mortal computation, not a Turing computation. |
Abstract
Computational functionalism posits that consciousness is a computation. Here we show, perhaps surprisingly, that it cannot be a Turing computation. Rather, computational functionalism implies that consciousness is a novel type of computation that has recently been proposed by Geoffrey Hinton, called mortal computation.