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The case for neurons: a no-go theorem for consciousness on a chip.

Johannes Kleiner, Tim A. Ludwig

Neuroscience of Consciousness December 26, 2024 DOI: 10.1093/nc/niae037 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Artificial intelligence Artificial consciousness Large language model Machine consciousness No-go theorem Artificial sentience Synthetic phenomenology
Key points Argues that, assuming consciousness is "dynamically relevant" to a system's temporal evolution, AI systems running on contemporary processors cannot be conscious, because such chips are designed and verified to adhere to computational dynamics that systematically preclude or suppress deviations. The authors state that this conclusion depends on the unestablished assumption of dynamical relevance.

Abstract

We apply the methodology of no-go theorems as developed in physics to the question of artificial consciousness. The result is a no-go theorem which shows that under a general assumption, called dynamical relevance, Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems that run on contemporary computer chips cannot be conscious. Consciousness is dynamically relevant, simply put, if, according to a theory of consciousness, it is relevant for the temporal evolution of a system's states. The no-go theorem rests on facts about semiconductor development: that AI systems run on central processing units, graphics processing units, tensor processing units, or other processors which have been designed and verified to adhere to computational dynamics that systematically preclude or suppress deviations. Whether our result resolves the question of AI consciousness on contemporary processors depends on the truth of the theorem's main assumption, dynamical relevance, which this paper does not establish.

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