Brain states matter. A reply to the unfolding argument.
Consciousness and Cognition October 1, 2020 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2020.102981 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA recent argument claimed that Integrated Information Theory and similar theories cannot explain consciousness (the 'unfolding argument'). A mathematical analysis proves that the argument's premises, if accepted, would imply the same problem for almost all theories of consciousness. However, one premise—that measures of brain activity cannot be used in empirical tests of consciousness theories—is unwarranted. When this premise is dropped, the argument no longer holds. Thus the unfolding argument is not valid.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Causal structure Integrated information theory Recurrent processing theory Theories of consciousness |
| Key finding | Demonstrates that the unfolding argument's premises imply a problem for almost all theories of consciousness, but one premise is unwarranted, so the argument is invalid. |
Abstract
Recently, it has been claimed that Integrated Information Theory and other theories of its type cannot explain consciousness ("unfolding argument"). We unravel this argument mathematically and prove that the premises of the argument imply a much stronger result according to which the observed problem holds for almost all theories of consciousness. We find, however, that one of the premises is unwarranted and show that if this premise is dropped, the argument ceases to work. Thus our results show that the claim of the unfolding argument cannot be considered valid. The premise in question is that measures of brain activity cannot be used in an empirical test of theories of consciousness.