Falsification and consciousness
arXiv Preprint Archive April 7, 2020 preprint
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Q-bio.nc Models of consciousness Explanations of mind Frameworks for consciousness Scientific verifiability testability Falsifiability Empirical validation Research methodology Scientific dilemmas Epistemological challenges Qualia problem Mind-brain dilemma |
| Key points | Argues that falsification is especially problematic for theories of consciousness because the standard testing setup leads to a dilemma: either theories are automatically falsified or unfalsifiable. |
Abstract
The search for a scientific theory of consciousness should result in theories that are falsifiable. However, here we show that falsification is especially problematic for theories of consciousness. We formally describe the standard experimental setup for testing these theories. Based on a theory's application to some physical system, such as the brain, testing requires comparing a theory's predicted experience (given some internal observables of the system like brain imaging data) with an inferred experience (using report or behavior). If there is a mismatch between inference and prediction, a theory is falsified. We show that if inference and prediction are independent, it follows that any minimally informative theory of consciousness is automatically falsified. This is deeply problematic since the field's reliance on report or behavior to infer conscious experiences implies such independence, so this fragility affects many contemporary theories of consciousness. Furthermore, we show that if inference and prediction are strictly dependent, it follows that a theory is unfalsifiable. This affects theories which claim consciousness to be determined by report or behavior. Finally, we explore possible ways out of this dilemma.