The Newman problem of consciousness science
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences January 30, 2026 DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2025.11827 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Context archaeology Qualia Philosophy of science Artificial consciousness Epistemology Cognitive science Subject documents |
| Key points | Argues that the Newman problem does not threaten consciousness science if phenomenal spaces and mathematical structures of conscious experience are understood correctly. |
Abstract
The Newman problem is a fundamental problem that threatens to undermine structural assumptions and structural theories throughout philosophy and science. Here, we consider the problem in the context of consciousness science. We introduce and discuss the problem, and explain why it is detrimental not only to structuralist assumptions, but also to theories of consciousness, if left unconsidered. However, we show that if phenomenal spaces, and mathematical structures of conscious experience more generally, are understood in the right way, the Newman problem does not arise. The upshot of this paper is that consciousness science needs to be careful in which definition of structure to consider, but if it is, the Newman problem disappears.