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Higher-order theories do just fine.

Matthias Michel, Hakwan Lau

Cognitive Neuroscience 2021 DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2020.1839402 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Commentary Peer reviewed
Keywords Consciousness Higher-order theories Perceptual reality monitoring
Key points Argues that higher-order theories of consciousness, specifically the Perceptual Reality Monitoring theory, can answer the 'small network argument' and the 'other systems argument' raised by Doerig et al., and thus satisfy their proposed criteria for theories of consciousness.

Abstract

Doerig et al. have set several criteria that theories of consciousness need to fulfill. By these criteria, higher-order theories fare better than most existing theories. But they also argue that higher-order theories may not be able to answer both the 'small network argument' and the 'other systems argument'. In response, we focus on the case of the Perceptual Reality Monitoring theory to explain why higher-order theories do just fine.

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