Criteria for empirical theories of consciousness should focus on the explanatory power of mechanisms, not on functional equivalence.
Johannes J Fahrenfort, Simon van Gaal
Cognitive Neuroscience January 1, 2021 DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2020.1838470 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA functionalist criterion for arbitrating between theories of consciousness is not theory-neutral because it focuses on functional equivalence between systems. Empirical theories of consciousness are mechanistic rather than functionalist, so such criteria are not helpful for arbitration.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Functionalism Functionalist explanation Mechanism Mechanistic explanation |
| Citations | 10 |
| Key finding | Argues that the criteria proposed by Doerig and colleagues for arbitrating between empirical theories of consciousness are not theory-neutral and are unhelpful because they focus on functional equivalence, whereas empirical theories are mechanistic. |
Abstract
Doerig and colleagues put forward the notion that we need hard and theory-neutral criteria by which to arbitrate between empirical (mechanistic) theories of consciousness. However, most of the criteria that they propose are not theory neutral because they focus on functional equivalence between systems. Because empirical theories of consciousness are mechanistic rather than functionalist, we think these criteria are not helpful when arbitrating between them.