Criteria for empirical theories of consciousness should focus on the explanatory power of mechanisms, not on functional equivalence.
Johannes J Fahrenfort, Simon van Gaal
Cognitive Neuroscience 2021 DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2020.1838470 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Functionalism Functionalist explanation Mechanism Mechanistic explanation |
| Citations | 10 |
| Key points | Argues that the criteria proposed by Doerig and colleagues for arbitrating between empirical theories of consciousness are not theory-neutral and are unhelpful because they focus on functional equivalence, whereas empirical theories are mechanistic. |
Abstract
Doerig and colleagues put forward the notion that we need hard and theory-neutral criteria by which to arbitrate between empirical (mechanistic) theories of consciousness. However, most of the criteria that they propose are not theory neutral because they focus on functional equivalence between systems. Because empirical theories of consciousness are mechanistic rather than functionalist, we think these criteria are not helpful when arbitrating between them.
Citations in the library
Cited by 6
- Explanatory profiles of models of consciousness - towards a systematic classification. Neuroscience of Consciousness August 27, 2021
- We need to explain subjective experience, but its explanation may not be mechanistic Neuroscience of Consciousness August 29, 2022
- When philosophical nuance matters: safeguarding consciousness research from restrictive assumptions. Frontiers in Psychology 2023
- Toward a true understanding of consciousness: the explanatory power behind the non-physicalist paradigm. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience April 10, 2026
- Can Lists of Requirements Help Consciousness Research Navigate Its Epistemological Quandaries? Journal of Consciousness Studies February 1, 2025
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