Criteria for empirical theories of consciousness should focus on the explanatory power of mechanisms, not on functional equivalence.
Johannes J Fahrenfort, Simon van Gaal
Cognitive Neuroscience 2021 DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2020.1838470 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness Functionalism Functionalist explanation Mechanism Mechanistic explanation |
| Citations | 10 |
| Key points | Argues that the criteria proposed by Doerig and colleagues for arbitrating between empirical theories of consciousness are not theory-neutral and are unhelpful because they focus on functional equivalence, whereas empirical theories are mechanistic. |
Abstract
Doerig and colleagues put forward the notion that we need hard and theory-neutral criteria by which to arbitrate between empirical (mechanistic) theories of consciousness. However, most of the criteria that they propose are not theory neutral because they focus on functional equivalence between systems. Because empirical theories of consciousness are mechanistic rather than functionalist, we think these criteria are not helpful when arbitrating between them.