ISSN 1758-8936, 1758-8928
38 papers in the library · 957 citations · publishing 2010-2026
Cognitive Neuroscience 2011 David A. Leopold
The explicit link between awareness and sociality put forward in the accompanying article opens new doors to thinking about the evolutionary origins of consciousness. Human subjective experience undoubtedly has some features that are species-specific and others that are shared over a broad phylogenetic base. The authors' proposal that consciousness depends on high-level neural circuits evolved...
Cognitive Neuroscience 2011 Alvaro A Rivera-Rei, Andrés Canales-Johnson, David Huepe et al.
Abstract A neuroanatomical model of urge-for-action phenomena has been proposed based on the "motivation-for-action" network (e.g., insula and mid-cingulate cortex). Notwithstanding the sound evidence presented regarding the functional and anatomical correlates of this model, the nature of the relationship between urges and conscious awareness remains to be addressed. Moreover, this model does...
Cognitive Neuroscience 2011 Michael S A Graziano, Sabine Kastner
A common modern view of consciousness is that it is an emergent property of the brain, perhaps caused by neuronal complexity, and perhaps with no adaptive value. Exactly what emerges, how it emerges, and from what specific neuronal process, is in debate. One possible explanation of consciousness, proposed here, is that it is a construct of the social perceptual machinery. Humans have...
Cognitive Neuroscience 2011 Henning Holle, Neil McLatchie, Stefanie Maurer et al.
The rubber hand illusion is one reliable way to experimentally manipulate the experience of body ownership. However, debate continues about the necessary and sufficient conditions eliciting the illusion. We measured proprioceptive drift and the subjective experience (via questionnaire) while manipulating two variables that have been suggested to affect the intensity of the illusion. First, the...
Cognitive Neuroscience September 1, 2010 Antti Revonsuo, Mika Koivisto 3 citations
Abstract Recent evidence from event-related brain potentials (ERPs) lends support to two central theses in Lamme's theory. The earliest ERP correlate of visual consciousness appears over posterior visual cortex around 100-200 ms after stimulus onset. Its scalp topography and time window are consistent with recurrent processing in the visual cortex. This electrophysiological correlate of visual...
Cognitive Neuroscience September 1, 2010 Victor A. F. Lamme
Is there consciousness in machines? Or in animals? What happens to consciousness when we are asleep, or in vegetative state? These are just a few examples of the many questions about consciousness that are troubling scientists and laypersons alike. Moreover, these questions share a striking feature: They seem to have been around forever, yet neither science nor philosophy has been able to...
Cognitive Neuroscience August 18, 2010 Morten Storm Overgaard 17 citations
Abstract Victor Lamme proposed that the study of consciousness should not be based on introspection. Nevertheless, Lamme understands consciousness as a subjective phenomenon, and introspection as the way in which we acquire knowledge about consciousness. This makes the task to find introspective-free methods to study consciousness difficult. Lamme attempts to make progress by introducing...
Cognitive Neuroscience August 18, 2010 Victor A. F. Lamme 11 citations
A proper science of consciousness combines all the available evidence - either coming from introspection, behavior, neuroscience or theory - in such a way that a 'best of all worlds' perspective is attained. Introspection shows us that qualia are all about perceptual organization. Neuroscience can then tell us where and when perceptual organization occurs, and whether this is independent of...
Cognitive Neuroscience August 18, 2010 Geraint Rees, Anil K. Seth 11 citations
The past decade has seen an explosion of interest in the neural mechanisms underlying consciousness. Experimental approaches from cognitive neuroscience that emphasize converging evidence from multiple methodologies have changed our understanding of how conscious mental states are associated with patterns of brain activity. In this special issue of Cognitive Neuroscience, we bring together five...
Cognitive Neuroscience August 18, 2010 Anil K. Seth, Adam B. Barrett 3 citations
Abstract A satisfying neuroscience of consciousness must account for phenomenological properties in terms of neural properties. While pursuing this project may challenge our intuitions about what we are conscious of, evidence from behavior and introspection should not be discounted. All three lines of evidence need to be integrated in order to naturalize phenomenal experience.
Cognitive Neuroscience August 18, 2010 Agustin Ibanez, Tristan A Bekinschtein 2 citations
Abstract Visual perception and integration seem to play an essential role in our conscious phenomenology. Relatively local neural processing of reentrant nature may explain several visual integration processes (feature binding or figure-ground segregation, object recognition, inference, competition), even without attention or cognitive control. Based on the above statements, should the neural...
Cognitive Neuroscience August 18, 2010 Murray Shanahan 1 citation
Abstract The neuroscience carried out by Lamme and colleagues is fascinating and important. But his case for localised phenomenology rests on a flawed understanding of rival theories and a misguided view of introspective report.
Cognitive Neuroscience July 1, 2010 Marcello Massimini, Fabio Ferrarelli, Michael J. Murphy et al. 205 citations
We recorded the electroencephalographic (EEG) responses evoked by transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) during the first rapid eye movement (REM) sleep episode of the night and we compared them with the responses obtained during previous wakefulness and NREM sleep. Confirming previous findings, upon falling into NREM sleep, cortical activations became more local and stereotypical, indicating...