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Bernard J. Baars

12 papers in the library · 322 citations · publishing 1995-2021

Papers

Consciousness in humans and non-human animals: recent advances and future directions

Frontiers in Psychology January 1, 2013 Melanie Boly, Anil K. Seth, Melanie Wilke et al. 295 citations

Consciousness research over the last decade has advanced through evidence that fronto-parietal connectivity and top-down processes enable information to travel across distant cortical areas, and through numerous dissociations between consciousness and cognitive functions such as attention in humans. Mental imagery paradigms now allow identification of covert awareness in non-responsive subjects. In non-human animals, technological enhancements have clarified the roles of cortical areas and higher-order thalamus for consciousness, and progress has been made in understanding non-vertebrate cognition relevant to possible conscious states. Major advances have also occurred in theories of consciousness and their comparison with available evidence.

Evolutionary Advantages of Stimulus-Driven EEG Phase Transitions in the Upper Cortical Layers.

Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience January 1, 2021 Robert Kozma, Bernard J. Baars, Natalie Geld

EEG recordings in humans and other mammals show beta/gamma oscillations (20-80 Hz) that self-organize into spatio-temporal structures recurring at theta/alpha rates (4-12 Hz), correlating with sensory stimuli and reinforcement contingencies. These structures repeatedly collapse, generating laterally propagating phase gradients (phase cones) that may be neural signatures of transient perceptual experiences. According to neuropercolation theory, waking brains operate as non-equilibrium thermodynamic systems at the edge of criticality, undergoing repeated phase transitions. Long-range axonal connections and metabolic processes regulate this critical dynamics. This cortical operating style may optimize a tradeoff between rapid adaptation and stable self-organization, offering Darwinian benefits.

Global workspace dynamics: cortical "binding and propagation" enables conscious contents.

Frontiers in Psychology January 1, 2013 Bernard J. Baars, Stan Franklin, Thomas Zoega Ramsoy

A global workspace (GW) is a functional hub for binding and propagating signals among loosely coupled signaling elements, and in the brain it may underlie conscious experiences. The cortico-thalamic core is thought to support conscious perception, thinking, learning, feelings of knowing, emotions, visual imagery, working memory, and executive control. Conscious contents are unitary and consistent at any moment but form a large, open set over time, suggesting the GW capacity is not localized to a single anatomical hub but is a dynamic functional capacity—a kind of neuronal cloud computing. Conscious contents may arise when multiple input streams settle on a winner-take-all equilibrium, igniting an any-to-many broadcast lasting about 100–200 ms. Conscious moments hold only 1–4 unrelated items, a small focal capacity that may be the biological price for global access.

Consciousness, Cognitive Theories of

Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science January 15, 2006 Bernard J. Baars

Consciousness is operationally defined as everything people report experiencing, including perception, mental images, inner speech, memories, semantics, dreams, hallucinations, emotional feelings, and aspects of cognitive and motor control. In cognitive theory, consciousness functions as a global access mechanism that presents a continuous stream of focal contents to executive control and decision-making processes.

Applying global workspace theory to the frame problem.

Cognition December 1, 2005 Murray Shanahan, Bernard J. Baars

The frame problem challenges cognitive science to explain how the brain can efficiently access relevant information from any domain without explicitly sorting through everything irrelevant. This paper argues that a global workspace architecture, which coordinates many parallel processes through a single serial thread of computation, offers a solution. Analogical reasoning is highlighted as a particularly demanding case of this unencapsulated information processing. Since global workspace theory also distinguishes conscious from unconscious processing, the author tentatively suggests that consciousness may be linked to how the biological brain solves the frame problem.

Global workspace theory of consciousness: toward a cognitive neuroscience of human experience.

Progress in Brain Research January 1, 2005 Bernard J. Baars

Global workspace theory proposes that conscious cognition involves widespread brain activity, especially in frontoparietal and medial temporal regions, while unconscious processing is limited to local areas. The theory emerged from cognitive architecture research and generates predictions for conscious aspects of perception, emotion, learning, and voluntary control. Brain imaging studies show that conscious tasks produce broad cortical activation, whereas unconscious conditions activate only local regions such as visual projection areas. Frontoparietal hypometabolism is also observed in unconscious states including deep sleep, coma, vegetative states, epileptic loss of consciousness, and general anesthesia. These findings support the global workspace hypothesis, which is endorsed by many scientists and philosophers.

How conscious experience and working memory interact.

Trends in Cognitive Sciences April 1, 2003 Bernard J. Baars, Stan Franklin

The active components of classical working memory are conscious, a fact that traditional theory does not account for. Global Workspace theory proposes that consciousness recruits unconscious specialized networks to perform detailed working memory functions. The IDA model offers a detailed analysis of this process, focusing on two classical working-memory tasks: verbal rehearsal and the use of a visual image. This analysis clarifies the interactions between conscious and unconscious aspects of working memory.

The conscious access hypothesis: origins and recent evidence.

Trends in Cognitive Sciences January 1, 2002 Bernard J. Baars

Consciousness may serve to mobilize and integrate otherwise separate brain functions, a hypothesis known as the 'conscious access hypothesis' first described in global workspace theory nearly two decades ago. The theory initially had little impact because consciousness was controversial, the evidence was indirect, and integrative theory was unfashionable. Recent neuroimaging evidence broadly supports the hypothesis, which has implications for perception, learning, working memory, voluntary control, attention, and self systems in the brain.

A Neural Global Workspace Model for Conscious Attention.

Neural networks : the official journal of the International Neural Network Society October 1, 1997 Sung Bae Cho, Bernard J. Baars, James Newman

A neurocognitive model of consciousness is presented, defining it as a global integration and dissemination system nested within a distributed array of specialized bioprocessors. This system controls the allocation of central nervous system processing resources via cortical gating of a strategic thalamic nucleus. The model integrates experimental data from cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, and neuroscience, building on developments of Baars' Global Workspace theory. The basic circuitry of this neural system is reasonably well understood and can be approximated using neural network principles.

Evidence that phenomenal consciousness is the same as access consciousness

Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995 Bernard J. Baars

The abstract argues that questions about consciousness—such as whether it is a single phenomenon or a collection of loosely related problems, and whether personal conscious experience is tightly linked to global cognitive access—cannot be settled by theoretical reasoning alone; they require empirical investigation. The author illustrates this by pointing to readers' own introspective experiences, such as the difference between central and peripheral vision, and the contrast between conscious and unconscious processing of a word's multiple meanings.