Open mind : discoveries in cognitive science
2025
Chris Frith
3 citations
Moving through our environment generates multiple changes in my sensations. But I do not experience the environment as changing. My conscious perceptual experience is of a stable environment through which I move. This perception is created by intricate neural computations that automatically take account of my movements. The stable environment that I experience is independent of my actions. As a...
arXiv Preprint Archive
August 17, 2023
Patrick Butlin, Robert Long, Eric Elmoznino et al.
Whether current or near-term AI systems could be conscious is a topic of scientific interest and increasing public concern. This report argues for, and exemplifies, a rigorous and empirically grounded approach to AI consciousness: assessing existing AI systems in detail, in light of our best-supported neuroscientific theories of consciousness. We survey several prominent scientific theories of...
Biol Psychiatry
May 25, 2018
Philipp Sterzer, Rick A. Adams, Paul Fletcher et al.
901 citations
Fueled by developments in computational neuroscience, there has been increasing interest in the underlying neurocomputational mechanisms of psychosis. One successful approach involves predictive coding and Bayesian inference. Here, inferences regarding the current state of the world are made by combining prior beliefs with incoming sensory signals. Mismatches between prior beliefs and incoming...
Frontiers in Psychology
2011
Chris Frith
9 citations
OPINION article Front. Psychol., 11 May 2011Sec. Consciousness Research volume 2 - 2011 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00087
Psychopharmacology
May 27, 2009
Philip R. Corlett, Chris Frith, Paul C. Fletcher
392 citations
INTRODUCTION: Various experimental manipulations, usually involving drug administration, have been used to produce symptoms of psychosis in healthy volunteers. Different drugs produce both common and distinct symptoms. A challenge is to understand how apparently different manipulations can produce overlapping symptoms. We suggest that current Bayesian formulations of information processing in...
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
October 1, 2001
Geraint Rees, Chris Frith
O'Regan & Noë (O&N) are pessimistic about the prospects for discovering the neural correlates of consciousness. They argue that there can be no one-to-one correspondence between awareness and patterns of neural activity in the brain, so a project attempting to identify the neural correlates of consciousness is doomed to failure. We believe that this degree of pessimism may be overstated; recent...
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
December 1, 1995
Chris Frith
AbstractGray has expanded his account of schizophrenia to explain consciousness as well. His theory explains neither phenomenon adequately because he treats individual minds (and brains) in isolation. The primary function of consciousness is to permit high level interactions with other conscious beings. The key symptoms of schizophrenia reflect a failure of this mechanism.