Presence, objecthood, and the phenomenology of predictive perception
Cognitive Neuroscience April 7, 2015 DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2015.1026888 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Phenomenology philosophy Perception Cognitive psychology Predictive value Cognitive science Epistemology |
| Citations | 56 |
| Key points | Argues that perceptual presence can be explained by counterfactually-rich predictive models, and that this requires distinguishing perceptual presence from phenomenal unreality. |
Abstract
Can perceptual presence be explained by counterfactually-rich predictive models linking perception and action? Considering an unusually rich range of responses to this idea has led me to (1) re-emphasize the core conceptual commitment of "predictive processing of sensorimotor contingencies" (PPSMC) to predictive model-based perception, (2) reconsider the relationship between presence and objecthood, and (3) refine the phenomenological target by differentiating between perceptual presence and the phenomenology of absence-of-presence, or "phenomenal unreality." It turns out that this requires blue-sky thinking.