How does the brain encode epistemic reliability? Perceptual presence, phenomenal transparency, and counterfactual richness
Cognitive Neuroscience April 3, 2014 DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2014.905519 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 39 |
| Key points | Argues that Seth's internalist model should be integrated with the idea that experiential realness and mind-independence are determined by the unavailability of earlier processing stages to attention, and that both counterfactual richness and attentional unavailability may indicate the overall processing level, which normally correlates with epistemic reliability. |
Abstract
Seth develops a convincing and detailed internalist alternative to the sensorimotor-contingency theory of perceptual phenomenology. However, there are remaining conceptual problems due to a semantic ambiguity in the notion of "presence" and the idea of "subjective veridicality." The current model should be integrated with the earlier idea that experiential "realness" and "mind-independence" are determined by the unavailability of earlier processing stages to attention. Counterfactual richness and attentional unavailability may both be indicators of the overall processing level currently achieved, a functional property that normally correlates with epistemic reliability. Perceptual presence as well as phenomenal transparency express epistemic reliability on the level of conscious processing.