The hard problem makes the easy problems hard - a reply to Doerig et al.
Cognitive Neuroscience January 1, 2021 DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2020.1838469 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe paper argues that the approach of setting aside the hard problem of consciousness—the question of why and how physical processes give rise to subjective experience—to focus only on measuring neural and functional correlates is not feasible. While some researchers advocate 'shut up and measure' as a pragmatic strategy, the authors contend that any data collection about consciousness necessarily involves an implicit or explicit stance on the hard problem itself. Thus, the hard problem cannot be bypassed through purely empirical methods.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness First-person perspective Functionalism Metacognition |
| Citations | 7 |
| Key finding | Argues that the 'shut up and measure' approach to consciousness is not feasible because collecting consciousness data requires an implicit or explicit stance on the hard problem. |
Abstract
In their paper Doerig et al. argue that we should put the hard problem aside and focus on empirical data to solve the 'easy' problems of consciousness - finding the neural and functional correlates of consciousness. In other words 'shut up and measure'. This has worked well with other thorny issues, such as explaining life, so why not adopt this approach here? We argue that despite the popularity of this view it is not feasible. In order to collect any consciousness data one needs to take an implicit or explicit stance on the hard problem.