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Predictive processing as an empirical theory for consciousness science.

Anil K. Seth, Jakob Hohwy

Cognitive Neuroscience 2021 DOI: 10.1080/17588928.2020.1838467 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Predictive processing Explanatory correlate
Key points Argues that progress in consciousness science requires elaborating systematic mappings between mechanisms and properties of consciousness, rather than seeking a single theory that identifies consciousness with one process.

Abstract

The theories of consciousness discussed by Doerig and colleagues tend to monolithically identify consciousness with some other phenomenon, process, or mechanism. But by treating consciousness as singular explanatory target, such theories will struggle to account for the diverse properties that conscious experiences exhibit. We propose that progress in consciousness science will best be achieved by elaborating systematic mappings between physical and biological mechanisms, and the functional and (crucially) phenomenological properties of consciousness. This means we need theories for consciousness science, perhaps more so than theories of consciousness. From this perspective, 'predictive processing' emerges as a highly promising candidate.