Growing public discussion about consciousness in animals, fetuses, organoids, and artificial intelligence has prompted strong claims. However, most of these claims rely on 'markers' of consciousness that measure general information processing capacity rather than subjective experience itself. Consequently, the usefulness of such markers for settling theoretical debates about consciousness may be limited.
People with aphantasia, who report no visual mental imagery, show the same gaze patterns as controls when reading imagery-rich stories. Both groups fixated longer on words and phrases describing sensory-rich perceptual imagery. Despite these identical eye movements, aphantasics reported feeling less immersed in the stories. Among controls, longer fixation on perceptual imagery correlated with stronger self-reported mental imagery, but this relationship was absent or reversed in aphantasics. The findings tentatively suggest that imagery may occur nonconsciously in aphantasia, with the condition primarily impairing introspective access to mental images rather than eliminating imagery itself.