What of the Hard Problem?
In Consciousness we Trust February 10, 2022 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198856771.003.0010 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that the subjective quality of conscious experience can be understood in terms of similarity relationships to other possible experiences, assessed through mammalian sensory cortices. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter argues that the subjective quality of a conscious experience can be understood in terms of how similar it is to all other possible experiences. We discuss how these similarity relationships can be implicitly and conveniently assessed, given the structure of the mammalian sensory cortices. These mechanisms allow the subject to “know”, without effort, what an experience is like. I will flesh out how this mental quality space view fits well with the theory of perceptual reality monitoring introduced in Chapter 7: subjective experience happens when qualitative sensory information acquires an assertoric force. We end by discussing why metaphysical theories generally don’t fare better in accounting for these qualitative aspects of consciousness, and may just hinder scientific progress.