The ethical impasse of current consciousness science.
Vincent Taschereau-Dumouchel, Jun Seo Hwang, Hakwan Lau, Joseph E LeDoux
Neuron June 17, 2026 DOI: 10.1016/j.neuron.2026.04.007 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractGrowing public discussion about consciousness in animals, fetuses, organoids, and artificial intelligence has prompted strong claims. However, most of these claims rely on 'markers' of consciousness that measure general information processing capacity rather than subjective experience itself. Consequently, the usefulness of such markers for settling theoretical debates about consciousness may be limited.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that markers of consciousness based on information-processing capacity are of limited use for arbitrating between competing theories of consciousness. |
Abstract
Rising media attention regarding consciousness in animals, fetuses, organoids, and AI has led to some rather strong statements. Most of these claims are based on "markers" of consciousness that track the general capacity for information processing rather than subjective experience per se. Accordingly, their relevance for theory arbitration may actually be limited.