The article shows that young Foucault's interest in phenomenology should not be understood as a more or less orthodox adherence to a singular philosophical program. Emphasis is given to the variety of contexts, meanings, and uses (or appropriations) of German phenomenology in France at the time when Foucault was interested in it at the beginning of his intellectual career. In particular, the...
This essay argues for a mixed‐resource approach to scientific modeling and applies it to questions in philosophy of mind. A mixed‐resource approach makes use of whatever resources—at whatever scale, from whatever academic discipline—seem useful, freely combining such varied resources in individual models. The success of mixed‐resource modeling challenges the widely shared commitment to a...
The academic study of Western esotericism has developed a sophisticated set of research approaches over the past three decades: historical-philological, discursive, sociological, anthropological, depth-psychological, and cognitive-scientific. Each approach illuminates important dimensions of esoteric traditions. What remains underdeveloped is a seventh approach: the...
This essay addresses a tension at the heart of the phenomenological method, namely the idea that phenomenology is both a method and an experience – it is both something we do and something we undergo. This dual understanding of the method generates questions as to how to best understand it. The above epigraphs are testament to the fact that the phenomenological reduction is not only something...
We examine the claim that a minimal-conceptual, “bare” awareness underlies ordinary experience, and whether this pre-conceptual awareness (PCA, or minimal-dual awareness) should be understood primarily as an earlier, biologically rooted developmental baseline, or as a disclosure of a deeper ontological reality. The Retrieval hypothesis treats PCA as a cognitive–neural default mode that can be...
Does our application of concepts in perception have a role in our understanding of the objectivity of what we perceive? I clarify a specific version of this question and present an argument for an affirmative answer: Conceptualism. I develop an objection to the resulting position drawing on Mackie's discussion in “Perception, Mind-Independence, and Berkeley”, offer an alternative...
Out-of-body experiences (OBEs) are phenomena in which a person perceives their consciousness as separate from their physical body. Although these experiences have been reported for centuries in spiritual traditions, they are attracting increasing interest in the fields of neuroscience, psychology and anthropology. This study aims to take stock of the issue through a literature review by...
Abstract This chapter shows how the view presented in the earlier chapter, Meta-Cartesianism, solves the illusion problem: it explains the illusion of phenomenal consciousness. One thing it notably does, which other views cannot do, is explain why phenomenal consciousness seems so introspectively obvious: why it seems to us that we are acquainted with our phenomenal experiences. Doing so,...
Abstract This chapter defends illusionism against various objections. First, the objection that illusionism is incoherent, because phenomenal consciousness cannot seem to exist without existing. Second, the objection that illusionism cannot explain how we represent phenomenal properties. Third, the objection that illusionism is only attractive if we assume a loaded definition of “phenomenal...
Abstract This chapter characterizes the illusion problem (the problem of explaining the illusion of phenomenal consciousness) and critically examines extant candidate solutions to it. First, it shows that solving the illusion problem is essential, and it details the problem’s explanandum and desired explanans. Then, it examines various views, focusing on those of Michael Graziano and Derk...
Abstract Many claim that there is an important relationship between consciousness and welfare. Call this general view phenomenalism . One way of fleshing out phenomenalism is to hold that consciousness is what makes one the type of entity that can be noninstrumentally better or worse off in the first place. Consciousness is at least a necessary condition on welfare subjecthood . A different...
Consciousness spans a range of phenomenological experiences, from effortless immersion to disengaged monotony, yet how such phenomenology emerges from brain activity is not well understood. Flow, a phenomenological experience frequently elicited by interactive media, has drawn attention for its links to performance and wellbeing, but existing neural accounts rely on single-region or...
Abstract Talkative artificial systems can sustain a realistic impression of intelligent agency, by generating quick, fluent, and context-sensitive strings of text in response to human input. Realism about AI treats this linguistic proficiency as evidence for an underlying suite of cognitive capacities, and so regards these technologies as subjects of psychological states. Firstly, I raise a...
The subjective lived experience of schizophrenia among China's Z Generation (born 1995-2009) remains understudied. This population navigates a unique socio-cultural context, making their personal narratives crucial for developing effective, person-centered mental health interventions. We employed a descriptive phenomenological approach, conducting in-depth interviews with four Chinese...
Abstract This paper reexamines Husserl’s analyses of kinesthesia and bodiliness, challenging two dominant interpretations in phenomenological scholarship: first, that Husserl’s analysis of kinesthesia implies an idea of embodied subjectivity; and second, that the distinction between Leib and Körper provides a clear conceptual foundation for his theory of embodiment. Through a close reading of...
Neurophenomenology has progressively consolidated as a research program aimed at integrating first-person lived experience with third-person neurobiological and behavioral measures. Nevertheless, despite its growing empirical development, neurophenomenology continues to face what Varela described as a “pragmatic and methodological limbo”. Subjective experience is recognized as scientifically...
Meditative experience has long been associated with conceptual attenuation, reduced reactivity to phenomena, increased present moment perception, and more pleasant experience. However, the computational mechanisms underlying such meditative deconstruction are not well understood, with no formal computational models available to explicate how deconstruction alters perception and action during...
Introduction Maladaptive Daydreaming (MD) is a relatively new and still under-recognized phenomenon. It is characterized by prolonged and emotionally engaging immersion in highly structured fantasies. Unlike normal daydreaming, MD involves narrative scenarios with complex characters and plots that may extend into real life. Individuals often spend hours per day in such fantasies, typically...
Micro-phenomenology, a research method dedicated to the study of lived experience, starts from the observation that a large part of it ordinarily remains invisible, concealed by tensions directed towards its objects. After describing the techniques used by the method to loosen these tensions, the article presents a surprising result: this gesture tends to soften or ‘subtilize’ the structures...
The term ‘near-death experience’ (NDE) refers to particular encounters reported by individuals who have been revived from the brink of death. The narratives provided by such individuals exhibit a core set of characteristics that are consistent across diverse populations. Although this suggests that NDEs may offer valuable insights into our understanding of the world, many scientists hold the...