10 papers in the library · 94 citations · publishing 2017-2026
July 31, 2026 François Kammerer
Abstract This book provides a defense and an exploration of illusionism regarding phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness supposedly encompasses mental states such as seeing a red spot, feeling pain in your back, or imagining the sound of a harp. All these states seem to feel like something, in a distinctive sense of “feel.” Phenomenal consciousness seems mysterious. It apparently...
June 11, 2026 François Kammerer
Abstract This chapter presents illusionism about phenomenal consciousness. Illusionism consists of two claims. First, phenomenal consciousness does not exist (eliminative claim). Second, it seems to exist (appearance claim). The chapter provides a historical overview of illusionism and details its different versions, before zeroing in on the version that the rest of the book will defend. The...
June 11, 2026 François Kammerer
Abstract This chapter defends illusionism against various objections. First, the objection that illusionism is incoherent, because phenomenal consciousness cannot seem to exist without existing. Second, the objection that illusionism cannot explain how we represent phenomenal properties. Third, the objection that illusionism is only attractive if we assume a loaded definition of “phenomenal...
June 11, 2026 François Kammerer
Abstract This chapter first defines phenomenal consciousness by appealing to introspection. It stresses that phenomenal consciousness seems mysterious: we are disposed to think that it has various mysterious peculiarities. It zeroes in on a few of these apparent mysteries. First, phenomenal consciousness seems introspectively obvious: it seems that, in introspection, our phenomenal experiences...
June 11, 2026 François Kammerer
Abstract This chapter shows how the view presented in the earlier chapter, Meta-Cartesianism, solves the illusion problem: it explains the illusion of phenomenal consciousness. One thing it notably does, which other views cannot do, is explain why phenomenal consciousness seems so introspectively obvious: why it seems to us that we are acquainted with our phenomenal experiences. Doing so,...
June 11, 2026 François Kammerer
Abstract This chapter argues for the most controversial claim of illusionism: the eliminative claim, which states that phenomenal consciousness does not exist. It does so via two arguments working in tandem. First, the Argument from Mysteries: because phenomenal consciousness seems mysterious, and because it does not help us explain other (non-phenomenal) things, we should reject its existence...
June 11, 2026 François Kammerer
Abstract This chapter examines illusionism’s implications for the science of consciousness. It presents current debates within the science of consciousness and oppositions between the main scientific theories of consciousness. It argues against two radical interpretations of illusionism’s implications: one on which illusionism makes all of consciousness science moot, and one on which it leaves...
June 11, 2026 François Kammerer
Abstract This chapter characterizes the illusion problem (the problem of explaining the illusion of phenomenal consciousness) and critically examines extant candidate solutions to it. First, it shows that solving the illusion problem is essential, and it details the problem’s explanandum and desired explanans. Then, it examines various views, focusing on those of Michael Graziano and Derk...
Philosophical Psychology November 11, 2025 Leonard Dung, François Kammerer 14 citations
Illusionism states that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, even though it seems to exist. While illusionism is controversial, it is a serious contender among theories of consciousness. We argue that it has substantial and non-trivial implications for non-human consciousness research (NHCR), particularly for the study of the distribution of phenomenal consciousness across beings. If...
Philosophical Psychology October 25, 2017 François Kammerer 80 citations
Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one does not need to explain how consciousness arises from purely physical brains anymore, but only to explain why consciousness seems to exist while it does not. As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism replaces the...