The Southern Journal of Philosophy
June 16, 2026
E. Basso
The article shows that young Foucault's interest in phenomenology should not be understood as a more or less orthodox adherence to a singular philosophical program. Emphasis is given to the variety of contexts, meanings, and uses (or appropriations) of German phenomenology in France at the time when Foucault was interested in it at the beginning of his intellectual career. In particular, the...
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
March 13, 2026
Christopher H. Bouton
In this paper, I explore the young Foucault's engagement with phenomenology in his master's thesis, The Constitution of a Historical Transcendental in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. I begin by outlining the context of this early work (Section 1), followed by a brief summary of the thesis and its overall argumentative structure (Section 2). In Section 3, I analyze Foucault's critique of Kant,...
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
July 9, 2024
Elsa Magnell, Niklas Dahl
We discuss the striking similarities between Friedrich Nietzsche's and Wilfrid Sellars's respective philosophies of mind. Drawing especially on recent Nietzsche scholarship by Riccardi and Katsafanas, we argue that the Nietzschean picture of consciousness is essentially the same as Sellars's view of conceptually structured thought. In particular, we argue that both consider structured thinking...
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
August 30, 2023
Matt E. M. Bower
1 citation
Abstract I present and critically examine Dan Zahavi's view that minimal selfhood and self‐awareness per se do not have a social character. I argue that Zahavi's conception of the minimal self as fundamentally asocial makes it hard to comprehend the unity of the self and that it is partly the result of an overly narrow conception of what it might mean for the self to be social.
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
March 30, 2022
D. Bruijn
2 citations
In recent work, Scott Soames (2010, 2013, 2015, 2019) and Peter Hanks (2011, 2013, 2015) have developed a theory of propositions on which these are constituted by complexes of intellectual acts. In this article, I adapt this type of theory to provide an account of perceptual content. After introducing terminology in section 1, I detail the approach proffered by Soames and Hanks in section 2,...
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
December 1, 2018
Shaun Gallagher
Abstract: It has been twenty years since Clark and Chalmers published “The Extended Mind.” In the present article I review the development of the extended mind hypothesis across what some proponents have defined as three theoretical “waves.” From first‐wave extended mind theory, based on the parity principle, to second‐wave complementarity, to the third wave, characterized as an uneasy...
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
December 1, 2017
Matt E. M. Bower
2 citations
Abstract Levinas is usually discussed as a philosopher wrestling with the nature of our experience of others, ethical obligation, and the divine. Unlike other phenomenologists, such as Husserl and Heidegger, he is not often mentioned in discussions about issues in philosophy of mind. His work in that area, especially on perception, is underappreciated. He gives an account of the nature of...
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
September 1, 2011
Greg Janzen
28 citations
abstract It is common parlance among philosophers who inquire into the nature of consciousness to speak of there beingsomething it is likefor the subject of a mental state to be in it. The popularity of the ‘what‐it‐is‐like’ phrase stems, in part, from the assumption that it enables us to distinguish, in an intuitive and illuminating way, between conscious and unconscious mental states:...
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
March 1, 2008
Timothy Lane, Caleb Liang
AbstractCurrently, one of the most influential theories of consciousness is Rosenthal's version of higher‐order‐thought (HOT). We argue that the HOT theory allows for two distinct interpretations: a one‐component and a two‐component view. We further argue that the two‐component view is more consistent with his effort to promote HOT as an explanatory theory suitable for application to the...
The Southern Journal of Philosophy
March 1, 2008
Cecilia Wee, Michael Pelczar
AbstractAfter drawing a distinction between two kinds of dualism—numerical dualism (defined in terms of identity) and modal dualism (defined in terms of supervenience)—we argue that Descartes is a numerical dualist, but not a modal dualist. Since most contemporary dualists advocate modal dualism, the relation of Descartes' views to the contemporary philosophy of mind are more complex than is...