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Routledge eBooks May 22, 2026 Claire Petitmengin
This chapter aims at presenting micro-phenomenology, a concrete “introspective” method enabling us to become aware of usually unrecognized dimensions of our lived experience, to describe them with rigor and precision, and to detect possible generic experiential structures. After a description of its origins, the chapter presents the devices used by the method to elicit the process of becoming...
May 22, 2026 Adam Pautz
This chapter provides an overview of the role of introspection in the debate over the nature of perceptual experience. I go through the main views of perceptual experience and look at some of the introspective claims that have been used to argue for or against those views. Along the way, I consider the relevance of introspection to recent debates about “laws of appearance” and the format of...
Oxford University Press eBooks May 21, 2026 Donovan Wishon
Abstract This chapter traces the development of Bertrand Russell’s philosophy of mind from his early engagements with panpsychism and idealism through his dualist period and finally to his mature neutral monism. It advances three central claims. First, Russell’s positions on the mind are consistently shaped by his sustained engagement with empirical psychology and the natural sciences. Second,...
Psychopathology May 21, 2026 Pavan S Brar, Elizabeth Pienkos, Gil Grunfeld et al.
An important feature of contemporary phenomenological psychopathology is the development of explanatory accounts, constructed at the level of first-person experience, for why certain phenomena appear in a psychiatric condition. Termed phenomenological explanation, this approach to explanation is intended to uniquely contribute to diagnostic classification and etiology. Despite its promise for...
Frontiers in Psychology May 20, 2026 Keisuke Suzuki
Altered states of consciousness, including hallucinations, psychedelic experiences, and ego dissolution, differ qualitatively, yet no unified computational framework describes what varies and along which dimensions. Computational phenomenology (CP) has emerged as a promising bridge between first-person experience and computational models, yet current formalisations rely predominantly on the...
Journal of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy May 15, 2026 Rusong Huang
A psychological sentence is commonly understood as representing a mental fact. This paper offers an alternative and argues that saying “Someone S is in a mental state M” is saying “There are some circumstances C such that S is in C, and it is rational for anyone in C to behave in a certain way.” To argue for this alternative, the paper appeals to the Sellarsian philosophy of mind but transforms...
European Journal of Philosophy May 14, 2026 Keith Allen
David Katz was an empirical psychologist with a deep and abiding interest in phenomenology. This paper reconstructs his theory of colour and colour perception, central to which is a distinctive account of the perception of illumination and empty space. Katz's views were an important influence on both the Gestalt psychologists and phenomenologists such as Merleau‐Ponty, and have contemporary...
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences May 14, 2026 Javier Sánchez-Cañizares
Abstract Irruption Theory (IT) offers a novel approach to understanding mind-brain interaction in decision-making. IT suggests that the mind’s influence on brain dynamics can manifest as “irruption” — the emergence of noise or physical fluctuations that alter brain activity. Lately, Irruption-Absorption Theory (IAT) has also incorporated the idea of “absorption,” which refers to the mental...
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences May 14, 2026 Marcelo Lopes
Abstract Philosophical approaches to psychopharmacology have paved the way for an important but still largely unexplored area in the philosophy of psychiatry. Some of these approaches have addressed conceptual, explanatory, and moral questions posed by psychopharmaceuticals, while shedding light on epistemological and methodological issues inherent to psychopharmacological practice. Yet, most...
Erkenntnis May 14, 2026 Yaron Wolf
Abstract Does experience itself unfold in time? This paper defends an extensional account of temporal consciousness—on which the temporal properties we directly experience match the temporal properties of experience itself—while drawing upon features of agential awareness. After showing that recent debate on the ability of introspection to settle the question about the temporal properties of...
Religious Studies May 14, 2026 Ricardo Sousa Silvestre
Abstract This paper explores the implications of Jīva Gosvāmī’s (sixteenth century) Bhedābheda Vedānta for the contemporary philosophical debate on consciousness, thereby contributing to the broader and growing interest in the insights that Indian traditions may bring to current discussions in the philosophy of mind. More specifically, I develop here a metaphysical, coarse-grained partial...
Research in Phenomenology May 12, 2026 Espen Dahl
Abstract Being born is an undeniable fact of every human life, yet it seems that one’s birth evades any direct phenomenological access. Motivated by this problem, this article proceeds in three main steps. It first examines the problem of birth from the first-person perspective, where birth appears as both presupposed and inaccessible. The second step reverses the perspective by approaching...
Research in Phenomenology May 12, 2026 David Inczauskis
Abstract This paper argues for the continued relevance of general, transcendental structures – especially Hannah Arendt’s concepts of natality and plurality – within critical phenomenology. Contrary to recent thinkers like Guenther, Oksala, Herrmann, and Marder, who critique the general as inherently oppressive and/or irrelevant, I propose that general conditions can provide a foundation for...
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences May 12, 2026 Daniel Neumann
Abstract The term “cognitive phenomenology” may be understood as referring to the idea that there is something it is like to entertain thoughts. One of the main problems in the debates on cognitive phenomenology is the question of how it should be construed, for instance in terms of being in a particular phenomenal state. In order to give a concise idea of what cognitive phenomenology is, I...
PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) May 12, 2026 Lorand Bruhacs preprint
One recurrent source of religious and mystical appearance lies in the way finite motifs resist finite closure and come to be inhabited under maximal, unconditioned, or unsurpassable forms. We call these forms limit-forms and argue that they are Husserlian horizonality under existential pressure: ordinary experience always exceeds what is presently given, but some horizons become...
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) May 10, 2026 preprint
Advaita Vedanta, the non-dualistic school of classical Indian philosophy systematized by Śaṅkara in the eighth century, offers one of the most sophisticated philosophical frameworks for understanding the nature of consciousness, self, and reality. Modern consciousness studies, an interdisciplinary field bringing together philosophy of mind, cognitive science, neuroscience, and contemplative...
Agrafa - Časopis za filozofiju psihoanalize May 8, 2026 Nikola Ačanski
The aim of this paper is to examine some of the implications that three dominant approaches to the phenomenon of mind in the philosophy of mind—physicalism, functionalism, and the phenomenological approach—may have for contemporary concepts of mental disorders. The physicalist framework, as a par excellence reductionist theory of mind, identifies mental disorders with somatic impairments,...
Journal of Transcendental Philosophy May 8, 2026 Hannes Gustav Melichar
Abstract This article examines how rational normativity can be integrated into nature without reduction or dualism. Drawing on Thomas Nagel’s critique of reductive naturalism and Husserl’s refutation of psychologism, it argues that adequate accounts of mind must respect the transcendental status of reason while also explaining how rational subjects belong to the natural world. The paper...
Psychopathology May 4, 2026 Paul Goldsmith
Delusions can be strikingly selective: individuals may hold highly elaborated, unshakeable beliefs in one domain while remaining otherwise cognitively intact. Models emphasising dopaminergic salience or belief-updating failures account for the intensity and persistence of delusions but struggle to explain their circumscribed nature. This paper develops a conceptual framework that complements...
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences May 2, 2026 Justin Aaron Moll
Abstract Sometimes our ability to make sense of the world breaks down. Such breakdowns of sensemaking give rise to a range of phenomena, including extreme experiences such as crisis and epiphany, as well as day-to-day forms of learning, frustration, or indifference. Various accounts in the domains of phenomenology and the neurocognitive and neurophysiological sciences capture facets of...