5 papers in the library · publishing 2009-2026
Mind & Language June 16, 2026 Robert D. Rupert
This essay argues for a mixed‐resource approach to scientific modeling and applies it to questions in philosophy of mind. A mixed‐resource approach makes use of whatever resources—at whatever scale, from whatever academic discipline—seem useful, freely combining such varied resources in individual models. The success of mixed‐resource modeling challenges the widely shared commitment to a...
Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind November 1, 2009 Robert D. Rupert
AbstractThis chapter addresses a realization-based interpretation of the extended approach. On this view, cognitive states are states of an organismically bounded cognitive system, yet may still have realizers—that is, physical implementations—that extend beyond the boundary of the organism. Functionalism in philosophy of mind, as well as the associated idea of a physical realization, is...
November 1, 2009 Robert D. Rupert
AbstractThis book surveys philosophical issues raised by the situated movement in cognitive science—the treatment of cognitive phenomena as the joint product of brain, body, and environment. The book focuses specifically on the hypothesis of extended cognition, according to which human cognitive processes literally comprise elements beyond the boundary of the human organism. A systems-based...
Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind November 1, 2009 Robert D. Rupert
AbstractIn this chapter, it is assumed that, in order for the debate over extended cognition (and mind) to have substance, there must be a genuine distinction between what is cognitive and what is not. This motivates the search for a mark of the cognitive, a principle demarcating the cognitive. Desiderata for a principle of demarcation are set out. Various principles supportive of the extended...
Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind November 1, 2009 Robert D. Rupert
AbstractThis chapter explores two routes from phenomenology to extended cognition. One appeals directly to the contents of conscious experience, for example, the subject's sense of having an extended body under certain conditions. It is argued that the best account of such results is an error theory, one that appeals to neural representations of body, self, and the environment; the general...