Mind & Language
January 22, 2026
Adriana Alcaraz-Sánchez
While most research on sleep mentation focuses on dream reports, sleep experiences can also include reports lacking content, such as white dreaming —the feeling of knowing one dreamt but being unable to recall its contents. I claim that white dreaming is a metacognitive feeling, akin to tip‐of‐the‐tongue and déjà experiences. Conceiving it this way allows for a more nuanced understanding of its...
Mind & Language
November 17, 2024
Leonard Dung, Luke Kersten
4 citations
Implementationalism maintains that conventional, silicon‐based artificial systems are not conscious because they fail to satisfy certain substantive constraints on computational implementation. In this article, we argue that several recently proposed substantive constraints are implausible, or at least are not well‐supported, insofar as they conflate intuitions about computational...
Mind & Language
October 19, 2022
Paweł Gładziejewski
4 citations
Perceptual experience usually comes with “phenomenal force”, a strong sense that it reflects reality as it is. Some philosophers have argued that it is in virtue of possessing phenomenal force that perceptual experiences are able to non‐inferentially justify beliefs. In this article, I introduce an alternative, inferentialist take on the epistemic role of phenomenal force. Drawing on Bayesian...
Mind & Language
June 1, 2022
Axel Constant, Andy Clark, Michael D Kirchhoff et al.
Cognitive niche construction is the process whereby organisms create and maintain cause-effect models of their niche as guides for fitness influencing behavior. Extended mind theory claims that cognitive processes extend beyond the brain to include predictable states of the world. Active inference and predictive processing in cognitive science assume that organisms embody predictive (i.e.,...
Mind & Language
September 1, 2011
Ian Phillips
176 citations
Philosophers have lately seized upon Sperling's partial report technique and subsequent work on iconic memory in support of controversial claims about perceptual experience, in particular that phenomenology overflows cognitive access. Drawing on mounting evidence concerning postdictive perception, I offer an interpretation of Sperling's data in terms of cue-sensitive experience which fails to...