Some philosophers argue that conventional silicon-based artificial systems cannot be conscious because they fail to meet certain substantive constraints on how computations are physically implemented. This article challenges those constraints, finding them implausible or poorly supported because they confuse general intuitions about computation with specific intuitions about consciousness. The authors propose that the mechanistic account of computation can better explain the intuitions behind these views while remaining consistent with the possibility of artificial consciousness. Their argument indirectly supports computationalism about consciousness and the idea that conventional artificial systems could be conscious.
Perceptual experiences often feel as though they directly reveal reality, a quality called phenomenal force. Some philosophers claim this force lets perceptions justify beliefs without inference. This article offers an alternative inferentialist view, drawing on Bayesian cognitive science to argue that the sense of reality in conscious vision can be epistemically evaluated based on its rational origins.
White dreaming—the feeling of having dreamt without recalling any content—is best understood as a metacognitive feeling, similar to tip-of-the-tongue or déjà vu experiences. Drawing on research about metacognitive feelings during wakefulness, the author argues that white dreaming can sometimes be a metacognitive illusion: a misleading feeling that appears to originate from a dream but may actually reflect a different kind of sleep experience, or no dream at all. This perspective provides a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon's nature and causes.
Cognitive niche construction—the process by which organisms build and maintain cause-effect models of their environment to guide adaptive behavior—can be understood through active inference, a framework in which organisms embody predictive models of the world optimized by perception, action, and learning. This paper proposes that cognitive niche construction itself is a cognitive function that optimizes these generative models, a process termed extended active inference. The account integrates ideas from extended mind theory, which holds that cognitive processes extend beyond the brain into the world, and predictive processing, offering a unified perspective on how organisms shape their niches to improve prediction and adaptive fitness.