Toward a Computational Phenomenology of Meditative Deconstruction: "Letting Go" and the Deconstruction of Experience With Active Inference.
Neural Computation June 2, 2026 DOI: 10.1162/neco.a.1534 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that the phenomenology of meditative deconstruction emerges from reducing precision of beliefs about hidden states in hierarchical inference, and that simulated agents using a letting-go policy can self-regulate affect. |
Abstract
Meditative experience has long been associated with conceptual attenuation, reduced reactivity to phenomena, increased present moment perception, and more pleasant experience. However, the computational mechanisms underlying such meditative deconstruction are not well understood, with no formal computational models available to explicate how deconstruction alters perception and action during meditation. Using the active inference framework, I demonstrate that the phenomenology of deconstruction-in terms of conceptual attenuation, reduced reactivity, and shorter temporal scale perception-naturally emerges from the dynamics of hierarchical inference when the deconstructive notion of letting go is cast as a reduction in precision of beliefs about hidden states at a specific level of the generative model. I present a formal hierarchical three-level generative model and simulate deconstruction as an intervention in a facial recognition task, where the agent selects a letting-go policy when perceived affective valence becomes excessively negative. The results demonstrate that the capacity to deconstruct permits agents to self-regulate experienced affect via letting go. The model offers a novel perspective within the paradigm of computational phenomenology on conceptual attenuation, equanimity, stillness, and affect during meditative deconstruction.
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Citations in the library
Cited by 1
Cites 29
- Active interoceptive inference and the emotional brain Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences October 11, 2016
- Investigating the phenomenological matrix of mindfulness-related practices from a neurocognitive perspective. American Psychologist October 1, 2015
- Interoception, contemplative practice, and health Frontiers in Psychology June 9, 2015
- The varieties of contemplative experience: A mixed-methods study of meditation-related challenges in Western Buddhists PLoS One May 24, 2017
- Mindfulness-induced selflessness: a MEG neurophenomenological study. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 2013
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