Addiction involves causal factors at many levels—biomedical, neurological, social, and legal—making a simple reductive explanation unlikely. An integrative framework is needed to unify these diverse sciences while respecting their autonomy. The theory of 'Externalist' or '4E' cognition (extended, embodied, embedded, enactive) is proposed as such a framework, emphasizing the central role of the wider environment in mental processes. The paper outlines how this perspective applies to psychiatry generally, then dissolves the classic dichotomy between 'choice model' and 'disease model' of addiction, clarifies how an addict's brain interacts with her environment, and explains the success of some recovery strategies while suggesting new ones.
Talkative artificial systems can create a realistic impression of intelligent agency by generating fluent, context-sensitive text. Realism about AI interprets this linguistic skill as evidence for underlying cognitive capacities, treating these technologies as subjects of psychological states. This paper challenges the realist view from the perspective of embodied cognition, questioning how digital systems could undergo interoceptive, affective, perceptual, and action-oriented mental states tied to an animate body. The author proposes that an anti-realist view aligns with a fictionalist attitude: when conversing with a talkative AI, we often imagine or pretend that our interlocutor is an autonomous agent, similar to engaging with fictional characters. These fictions are distinctive for being interactive, co-constructed, self-involving, and capable of blending reality with imagination.
The thesis of the extended mind (ExM) argues that mental states and processes are not limited to the brain or body; under the right conditions, material artifacts can become part of a person's mind. This paper extends ExM to affective phenomena, such as emotions, moods, sentiments, temperaments, and character traits. The authors argue that if ExM is accepted for cognitive states like beliefs and planning, it should also apply to affective states. They clarify the core commitments of ExM and examine how dispositional and occurrent emotions can be supported by external objects and tools, concluding that the vehicles of affectivity can extend beyond biological boundaries.