This paper reexamines Husserl's analyses of kinesthesia and bodiliness, arguing against two common interpretations: that his analysis of kinesthesia implies embodied subjectivity, and that the distinction between Leib (lived body) and Körper (physical body) provides a clear foundation for his theory of embodiment. Through close reading, the author shows that Husserl's notion of "bodiless kinesthesia" reveals a conceptual gap between kinesthetic experience and embodiment. Kinesthesia is defined not as inner bodily sensation but as the spontaneity of transcendental subjectivity, an egoic activity of the "I can," while the body itself is classified as not-egoic.
Disembodiment—a diminished sense of body ownership—is often interpreted as a Cartesian mind-body split. This paper argues that such a dualist interpretation is phenomenologically untenable because experiencing alienation is itself an embodied process. Instead, it endorses a multisensory disintegration account, offering a Husserlian reading that distinguishes different senses of spatiality specific to distinct sense-fields. Each sense-field has its own centre of orientation, so a split between them leaves the subject with discordant points of orientation. The analysis focuses on vision extricated from touch and touch disengaged from vision, concluding with limitations and prospects for further research.