Skip to content

Husserl Studies

ISSN 0167-9848

7 papers in the library · publishing 2012-2026

Papers

Sort Most recent Most cited

Edmund Husserl’s Account of Non-Normality: Towards a Phenomenological Cartography

Husserl Studies August 30, 2026 Tommaso Bigatti

Abstract Over the last few years, issues related to the phenomenology of norms, normality, and normativity have been widely discussed in the scholarship. While several contributions devoted to Husserl’s account of normality exist, a systematic investigation of the categories of “non-normality” proves to be lacking. Moreover, such an investigation is necessary to grasp the essential link between...

The Fatal Mistake in the Logical Investigations

Husserl Studies July 11, 2026 Meir Kurzweil

Abstract In The Idea of Phenomenology , Husserl presents two different senses of the distinction between the immanent and the transcendent: a mereological sense and an epistemic sense. The failure to distinguish between these two senses leads to what he calls a “fatal mistake,” namely, the assumption that what is given absolutely in the epistemic sense is restricted only to what is immanent in...

From Bodiless Kinesthesia to “Inner-Body”: On the Split of Body in Husserl’s Phenomenology

Husserl Studies June 3, 2026 Boda Liu

Abstract This paper reexamines Husserl’s analyses of kinesthesia and bodiliness, challenging two dominant interpretations in phenomenological scholarship: first, that Husserl’s analysis of kinesthesia implies an idea of embodied subjectivity; and second, that the distinction between Leib and Körper provides a clear conceptual foundation for his theory of embodiment. Through a close reading of...

DOI: 10.1007/s10743-026-09376-8 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Phenomenology philosophy Embodied cognition Realm Transcendental number +9

Towards a Phenomenological Understanding of Disembodiment in Schizophrenia

Husserl Studies March 14, 2026 Vasile Visoțchi

Abstract The aim of this paper is to analyse the experience of disembodiment in light of Husserl’s phenomenology. Given that disembodiment is characterized by a diminished sense of body ownership, it is usually interpreted in a Cartesian manner as involving a mind-body dichotomy. Contrary to this view, firstly, I argue that the dualist interpretation of disembodiment is phenomenologically...

DOI: 10.1007/s10743-026-09369-7 (opens in new tab) Full text (opens in new tab) Embodied cognition Phenomenology philosophy Interpretation philosophy Subject documents +8

Husserl on Minimal Mind and the Origins of Consciousness in the Natural World

Husserl Studies December 8, 2021 B. Marosán

The main aim of this article is to offer a systematic reconstruction of Husserl’s theory of minimal mind and his ideas pertaining to the lowest level of consciousness in living beings. In this context, the term ‘minimal mind’ refers to the mental sphere and capacities of the simplest conceivable subject. This topic is of significant contemporary interest for philosophy of mind and empirical...

Dan Zahavi (ed.): The Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology

Husserl Studies July 10, 2018 Thomas J. Nenon

The Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology contains thirty-seven new essays by leading scholars in the field. The essays all highlight historical influences, connections, and developments and provide an in-depth coverage of the development of phenomenology; one that allows for a better comprehension and assessment of the continuity as well as diversity of the phenomenological...

Intentionality and Presence: On the Intrinsic Of-ness of Consciousness from a Transcendental-Phenomenological Perspective.

Husserl Studies April 27, 2012 Wolfgang Fasching

This paper discusses the nature of consciousness' intrinsic intentionality from a transcendental-phenomenological viewpoint. In recent philosophy of mind the essentially intentional character of consciousness has become obscured because the latter is predominantly understood in terms of "qualia" or the "what-it-is-like-ness" of mental states and it is hard to see why such subjective "feels", of...