Animal Sentience
January 1, 2016
Anil K. Seth
49 citations
The question of whether fish consciously feel pain cannot be settled by looking for the same neural mechanisms that underlie human pain reports. Non-mammalian consciousness, if it exists, may rely on different mechanisms. Neurophysiological and behavioral evidence, evolutionary considerations, and Bayesian brain theories suggest that if fish can feel at all, they can feel pain. Because pain and suffering are qualitative experiences, the precautionary principle obliges us to accommodate the possibility that fish feel pain where doubt remains.
Animal Sentience
August 19, 2016
Shimon Edelman, Roy Moyal, Tomer Fekete
16 citations
A commentary on Klein & Barron's argument for insect consciousness aims to strengthen their case by appealing to computational theory in addition to neural mechanisms. The authors discuss three distinctions relevant to phenomenal awareness: the capacity for awareness versus its contents, awareness versus selfhood, and the distinction between easy and hard problems in consciousness research. The commentary supports the view that insects may possess a form of consciousness, challenging anthropocentric assumptions in the science and philosophy of mind.
Animal Sentience
September 1, 2016
E. Paul, M. Mendl
9 citations
Klein & Barron's proposal that insects may have phenomenal consciousness challenges the cautious stance of many researchers. While the skeptical view that neural and behavioral parallels between humans and insects need not imply conscious experience cannot be falsified, if Klein & Barron are correct, it is important to consider the possible contents of insect consciousness. This discussion explores whether affective consciousness, with its implications for potential suffering, might also be part of the simulated perceptual conscious world they propose. In humans, affect-induced modulation of decision-making leads to cognitive bias, and the question is raised whether this can be observed in animals and used as a novel indicator of animal affect and welfare.
Animal Sentience
January 1, 2022
Sabina Schrynemakers
1 citation
David Peña-Guzmán argues against the claim that only humans can commit suicide because only humans have free will, offering two reasons: nonhuman animals may possess free will, and the libertarian concept of free will conflicts with scientific explanation. While the objection to restricting suicide to humans is correct, his critique of libertarian free will is misdirected; the real issues are the assumptions that free choices require conscious self-reflection or that freedom cannot vary in degree.
Animal Sentience
July 6, 2023
José E Burgos, Giselle M. Castañeda
This commentary argues that while Segundo-Ortin and Calvo's hypothesis that plants have phenomenal consciousness or sentience may seem implausible, it is less radical than panpsychism, the view that everything is sentient. The authors use a discussion of panpsychism to raise philosophical questions about the plant-consciousness hypothesis. They contend that considering panpsychism highlights conceptual challenges that Segundo-Ortin and Calvo's behavioral evidence does not resolve.
Animal Sentience
August 24, 2016
Shelley Adamo
Whether insects can have subjective experiences depends on how subjective experience is defined. The definition used by Klein & Barron (2016) is unusually liberal and could be used to argue that some modern robots have subjective experiences. From an evolutionary perspective, the additional neurons needed for subjective experiences are proportionately more expensive for insects than for mammals because of the small size of the insect brain, which could weaken selection for such traits. It may be premature to assume that small neuronal number is unimportant in determining the capacity for consciousness.
Animal Sentience
August 19, 2016
Holk Cruse, Malte Schilling
This commentary extends Klein and Barron's comparison of human and insect cognition to robots, raising two objections. One objection concerns the epistemological problem of subjective experience, questioning whether robots can possess it. The other objection challenges whether insects require integrated spatiotemporal modeling for navigation, suggesting simpler mechanisms may suffice. The authors argue that these points undermine the claim that insects and robots share functionally equivalent cognitive processes.
Animal Sentience
August 10, 2016
Andy Lamey
Klein & Barron's analysis examines the capacity for subjective experience in insects, not specifically pleasure or pain. They note that insects have traditionally been thought incapable of such experience. If future research shows some insect species are conscious but cannot feel pain, a philosophical question arises that ethicists have not addressed: whether a conscious creature lacking pain sensitivity has moral standing.