Philosophies
July 16, 2019
Riccardo Manzotti
23 citations
Embodied cognition (EC) has offered artificial intelligence an alternative to traditional computationalism, splitting into weak and strong versions. The weak version borders on functionalism, while the strong version claims body–world interactions constitute cognition. However, the notion of constitution is ontologically problematic and offers no clear empirical or technical benefits. This paper examines ontological issues in both approaches—circularity, epiphenomenalism, mentalism, and disguised dualism—and proposes a more radical alternative called mind-object identity, briefly compared with sensorimotor direct realism and embodied identity theory.
Artificial intelligence in medicine
October 1, 2008
Riccardo Manzotti, Vincenzo Tagliasco
16 citations
Artificial consciousness remains a nascent field. This paper outlines theoretical assumptions that could help address phenomenal consciousness—the subjective, first-person experience of being. It identifies technological and theoretical obstacles facing researchers and argues that artificial consciousness must confront how phenomenal consciousness arises in a physical world. The authors suggest that externalist models, which locate mental content partly outside the brain, currently offer the most promising path forward.
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
December 31, 2021
Riccardo Manzotti
1 citation
Consciousness can be located and bounded using a strictly physicalist approach. The paper identifies two unresolved issues in the extended cognition debate: the ontological status of cognition and the fallacy of the center. It proposes using identity to isolate the physical basis of consciousness, introducing Mind-Object Identity (MOI) as a tentative solution and comparing it with other identity theories of mind.
Frontiers in Psychology
January 1, 2019
Riccardo Manzotti
A mind-object identity theory is proposed: one's experience of an object is identical with the object itself. The hypothesis is defended by redefining physical objects in terms of relative and actual properties. Cases of misperception like dreams and hallucinations are addressed by redefining the notion of present in relative terms. Both the object and the present are recast as object-relative.
Frontiers in Robotics and AI
January 1, 2018
Riccardo Manzotti, Antonio Chella
The paper argues that current approaches to building conscious robots, collectively termed Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Consciousness (GOFAC), share a flawed conceptual framework. GOFAC includes methods like global workspace theory, information integration, enaction, cognitive mechanisms, and embodiment. The authors identify the intermediate level fallacy as the central problem with GOFAC, where researchers mistakenly assume that implementing cognitive or neural correlates of consciousness will produce subjective experience. The paper outlines an alternative conceptual framework for robot consciousness, though it does not provide a concrete design or empirical results.
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia
May 1, 2016
Riccardo Manzotti
A philosophical paper proposes an alternative identity theory of consciousness called OBJECTBOUND, which suggests that consciousness of an external object is identical with that object itself, not with neural activity. When perceiving a yellow banana, the conscious experience of the banana is one and the same as the physical banana that can be grabbed and eaten. The author outlines this hypothesis and examines the relationship between mind, body, and object, then addresses traditional objections involving hallucinations, illusions, and commonsense assumptions.
Advances in experimental medicine and biology
January 1, 2011
Riccardo Manzotti
Machine consciousness will eventually need to confront the concept of free will, either to reject it or to implement it in machines. It is uncertain whether freedom and consciousness are separate features of the human mind or arise from the same underlying structure. This review examines literature on the link between determinism and freedom, typically discussed by compatibilists, and then sketches a preliminary model for machine free will.