Anthropomorphic denial of fish pain
Lynne U. Sneddon, Matthew C. Leach
Animal Sentience August 3, 2026 DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1048 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Evolution Neuroscience and neurobiology Cognitive neuroscience Aquaculture and fisheries Zoology Cognition and perception Life sciences |
| Key points | Argues that Key's denial of fish pain is based on inconsistent reasoning and outdated views on brain evolution, and that current evidence supports the possibility of pain in fish. |
Abstract
Key (2016) affirms that we do not know how the fish brain processes pain but denies — because fish lack a human-like cortex — that fish can feel pain. He affirms that birds, like fish, have a singly-laminated cortex and that the structure of the bird brain is quite different from that of the human brain, yet he does not deny that birds can feel pain. In this commentary we describe how Key cites studies that substantiate mammalian pain but discounts the same kind of data as evidence of fish pain. We suggest that Key's interpretations are illogical, do not reflect the published empirical evidence for pain in fish, and are out of touch with current thinking on brain evolution. We agree that more scientific data are needed to understand how the brains of fish — and other organisms — function. But the incompleteness of current knowledge certainly does not constitute evidence for inferring that fish in particular do not feel pain.