Phenomenal consciousness in insects? A possible way forward
Animal Sentience August 3, 2026 DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1159 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Evolution Cognitive neuroscience Zoology Cognition and perception Life sciences |
| Key points | Argues that Klein and Barron's midbrain-based account of subjective experience is flawed, and proposes that the capacity for subjective experience should be assessed through fundamental neural computations, specifically metarepresentations and high-level representations entering working memory. |
Abstract
Klein & Barron (2016) propose that subjective experience in humans arises in the midbrain and then argue that insects have the capacity for subjective experience because their nervous system can perform neural processing similar to that of the midbrain. This approach ultimately fails because it is built on the false premise that the midbrain is the source of the awareness of sensory stimuli. I instead propose that the capacity for subjective experience must be based on fundamental neural computations that generate the “what it feels like” experience. Two such computations associated with metarepresentations and high level representations entering working memory are discussed as possible measures of the capacity for subjective experience.